

China's Non-proliferation Policy and the Implementation of WMD Regimes in the Middle East

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Abstract: *The interaction between China and the Middle East on the issue of arms transfer and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has elicited great concern since the 1980s. It was also during this period that China was accused, primarily by the US, of being involved in WMD-related transfers to the Middle East. The paper examines China's changing attitudes towards major international non-proliferation regimes and cases of US allegations of China's exports of WMDs to the Middle East. It argues that China's stance on abiding by the WMD regimes in the Middle East has been consistent with the principles of diplomacy which emphasizes peace and the pursuit of its good image as a responsible great power. China abides by the international WMD regimes and is seeking more cooperation in non-proliferation with other countries, and its efforts deserve acknowledgement.*

Key Words: *China; Non-proliferation Policy; WMD Regimes; Middle East; International Cooperation*

I. Introduction

Since its establishment in 1949, People's Republic of China's position has transformed from isolation to integration into the global community. Similarly, the history of China's non-proliferation policy went through a process of non-participation or even repudiation to positive promulgation towards the international regimes of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Middle East, the most turbulent area in the world, plays a pivotal role in world politics. Thus, the interaction between China and the Middle East on the issue of arms transfer and non-proliferation gained great concern since the 1980s when China launched its "reform and opening up" policy and large numbers of arms transfers were executed. In recent years, although China's role in the implementation of WMD regimes in the Middle East is somehow marginalized, it is worth studying, especially with the rising of the Iranian nuclear crisis.

Previous studies on China's non-proliferation policy covered a wide range of issues. For example, Chinese scholars such as Hu, Yuan and Zhu^② explored the evolution of

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^② Weixing Hu, "China's Nuclear Export Controls: Policy and Regulations," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.1, No. 2, Winter 1994; Jing-dong Yuan, "The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policy since the

China's nuclear non-proliferation policy while non-Chinese scholars such as Gill, Kan, Lieggi and Medeiros^① have also examined Chinese non-proliferation policy. At the same time, some scholars such as Eikenberry, Grimmett and Segal^② touched on the area of arms transfers between China and the Middle East. However, the study, which examines China's most updated non-proliferation policy and its interaction with the Middle East on WMD-related transfers, remained scarce. Based on analysis of previous studies, government documents and newspaper reports, the present article aims to supplement these studies and shed light on this issue.

The first part of the paper illustrates the general history of China's non-proliferation policy and points out its general trend. The second part explores related allegations against China on WMD-related transfers to the Middle East since the 1980s. This is followed by the final part which provides the author's analysis on China's non-proliferation policy and its impact on the implementation of WMD regimes in the Middle East.

II. Overview of China's Non-proliferation Policy

1. Free-rider out of International WMD Regimes (1949-1978)

Under the leadership of China's former Chairman Mao Zedong, China successfully carried out its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964. Until the implementation of China's new leader Deng Xiaoping's "reform and opening up" policy in 1978, China had been a country that advocated proliferation. Nevertheless, China's policy on WMDs during this early stage was characterized by two features: pro-nuclear proliferation and anti-imperialism.

Such a policy came out as a response to the international political development in the 1950s which featured "nuclear blackmail" from imperialist powers, mainly the United States.^③ In July 1950, for example, former US President Harry Truman urged China not to participate in the Korean War (1950-1953). To strengthen his position, Truman ordered the deployment of ten nuclear-configured B-29s to the Pacific.^④ Two years later, another US President Dwight Eisenhower suggested publicly that if the armistice talk with North Korea bore no fruit, he would approve the use of nuclear weapons against China.^⑤ Even after the

1990s: Progress, Problems, and Prospects," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol.11, No.31, 2002; Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol.4, No.2, Winter 1997.

^① Bates Gill, "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: the Dynamics of Chinese Nonproliferation and Arms Control Policy-making in an Era of Reform," in David M. Lampton, ed., *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy: In the Era of Reform, 1978-2000*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001; Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," *Congressional Research Service*, 2013; Stephanie Lieggi, "From Proliferator to Model Citizen? China's Recent Enforcement of Nonproliferation-related Trade Controls and Its Potential Positive Impact in the Region," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Vol.4, No. 2, Summer 2010; Evan S. Medeiros, *Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.

^② Karl W. Eikenberry, "Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfer," *McNair Paper*, No.36, Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, February 1995; Richard F. Grimmett, Paul K. Kerr, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011," *Congressional Research Service*, 2012; Anne Gilks, Gerald Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*, London: Croom Helm, 1985.

^③ "Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *People's Daily*, October 16, 1964.

^④ Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War," *International Security*, Vol.13, No.3, Winter 1988-1989, pp.50-91.

^⑤ John Wilson Lewis, Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988,

Korean War, US Navy Admiral Arthur Radford talked publicly of the use of nuclear weapons if China invaded South Korea.^①

The moment China succeeded to have its own nuclear technology, the government's policy toward nuclear weapons took on an ideological inclination. More specifically, China aimed at breaking the monopoly of the imperial nuclear powers. In the official statement regarding China's first nuclear test stated that China's possession of nuclear weapons was the first step toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and China adhered to the principle of no-first-use and peaceful deployment of nuclear weapons.^② Moreover, the Chinese government declared that it will stand consistently with the Third World people and share with the developing world the nuclear technology with peaceful purposes.^③ In other words, China at this time, supported the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but on the condition that it would help the developing world to erode the imperial powers' nuclear monopoly.

In fact, China's anti-imperial policy on WMDs was also a response to the international WMD regime's policy. The only export control regime at the time, the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), formed in 1949, excluded China as a member because of China's communist identity. This period also saw a number of international non-proliferation regimes in the Western world. The most influential nuclear weapon control regimes, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Non-proliferation Treaty or NPT) were established in 1957 and 1970 respectively. Until the 1980s, China kept claiming that these international non-proliferation regimes were discriminatory towards China.

However, transfer of WMD-related items to other countries from China remained sparse. One reason for such phenomenon could be the internal political environment that China went through during the period. After the newly established country's hardest years during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), China faced a deplorable economy, with hundreds of thousands dying of hunger. Two years after its first nuclear test in 1964, a 10-year nationwide movement, the Cultural Revolution haunted the country, destroying much of its technological, cultural and material progress. At the time, China kept isolated from the outside world.^④

2. Gradual Integration into the International Community (1978-Present)

Beginning in the 1980s, China's history was rewritten under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping's "reform and opening up". Indeed, the 1980s were the apex of China's arms exports to the international community, especially to the Middle East and South Asia.^⑤ It was also from this period onward that China's non-proliferation policy was gradually becoming convergent with major international non-proliferation powers. Even though it did not join all the relevant regimes, its policies and activities were carried out inside of their framework.

pp.13-14.

^① Ibid., p. 32. See also NTI, "Nuclear," July 2015, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/nuclear/>.

^② Hui Wang, Chengzhuo Hui, "China Consistently Upholds the Policy of No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Xinhua*, October 22, 2015.

^③ "Declaration of the Government."

^④ Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," p.43; also see Jonathan E. Davis, "Export Controls in the People's Republic of China," Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, February 2005, p.5.

^⑤ Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977*, London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

The changing environment at home and abroad from this time onward provided China with the impetus and necessity to comply with international non-proliferation standards. Much different from the previous period, which saw China's economy nearly completely controlled by the state, Deng's reform and opening up freed the former state-owned enterprises and encouraged foreign investment in China and Chinese exports. At the same time, the mainland government used its export policy to win international recognition as a legitimate member in the international community instead of Chinese Taiwan. Following a large amount of weapons export, including WMDs, the international community, the US in particular, put more pressure on China to join the non-proliferation regimes.

In fact, China's changing attitude towards international non-proliferation regimes was in line with its national interests as well. By complying with them, China could benefit both in political and security terms. In the 1980s, China saw "advantages for Beijing in 'free-riding' on arms control agreements that placed restrictions on other powers to China's benefit, including the various accords between Moscow and Washington on reductions of strategic nuclear forces, elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and limitations on anti-ballistic missile systems."^① Moreover, China could improve its image as a "responsible great power" on the world stage by participating in the international non-proliferation regimes.

2.1 China and Nuclear-related Regimes

In the nuclear area, China participated in most of the international regimes. It joined the IAEA in 1984, declaring that all its nuclear-related exports would under international safeguards.^② Later during the same year, former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang declared publicly that China would not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation.^③

Seven years later in 1991, Chinese officials for the first time, declared publicly the support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a treaty that was seen by China as discriminatory for the past few decades. Former Chinese Premier Li Peng announced that China would join the NPT during then Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's visit to Beijing.^④ China eventually signed the treaty in 1992 and acceded to the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995.

Some analysts hold the idea that Beijing's policy change was a reaction to the world's attitude. On the one hand, more and more Chinese believed that acceding to the treaty could bring more security to China and the world, especially when it was related to North Korea's nuclear issue.^⑤ Being one of the five permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) members and under the pressure from public opinions, China's joining the NPT was also influenced by the 1989 Tiananmen Events and France's participation in the NPT in 1991.^⑥

After joining the NPT, China actively promoted its idea of improving the NPT to be a more just and equal treaty especially to the developing countries. It argued that the

^① Banning N. Garrett, Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspective on Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security*, Vol.20, No.3, Winter1995/96, p.47.

^② Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," pp.40-48.

^③ "China Joins Agency that Inspects Reactors," *New York Times*, October 12, 1983; see also David Willis, "Some Progress is Seen on Containing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 25, 1983, p.1; "Chinese Premier's Remarks at White House Banquet," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, January 12, 1984.

^④ "Beijing Agrees to Participate in Nonproliferation Treaty," *Xinhua*, August 10, 1991.

^⑤ Bu Ran, "The International Nuclear Non-proliferation Mechanism," *Beijing Review*, Vol.37, No.51, December 19-25, 1994, p.20; Vipin Narang, "Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.38, No.1, 2015, p.83.

^⑥ At this time, China and France were the only two countries among the five declared nuclear powers that did not sign the NPT.

non-nuclear states should not develop nuclear weapons, but in order to protect their interests, the states with nuclear power should first provide security guarantee to them. Second, the nuclear states should commit themselves to not further developing more nuclear weapons and work together for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, all states should share the nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.^①

In 1996, China made its final decision to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). For China, signing the CTBT was more difficult than signing the NPT because the CTBT would finally lead to complete prohibition of nuclear tests, thus eliminating China's hope to further modernize its warheads and narrow the qualitative gap between China, the US and Russia.^② Nonetheless, the Chinese also realized the benefits that the treaty could bring. Qian Qichen, then China's Vice Premier, for instance, stated that "granted that a nuclear test ban is necessary, to undertake not-to-use nuclear weapons at all is far more crucial, because this will not only make their testing, development, production or deployment devoid of any meaning, but will give a great impetus to nuclear disarmament, which will contribute tremendously to world peace and security."^③

Before signing the CTBT, China voiced its own conditions at the Geneva negotiation meeting: first, the declared nuclear powers should have the right to conduct Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs); second, the nuclear states should accede to the principle of No-First-Use (NFU) and Negative Security Assistance (NSA); third, the International Monitoring System (IMS) should be in a prior place than the National Technical Means (NTM) of individual states.^④

In order to put more efforts on non-proliferation, China joined the Zangger Committee (ZAC) one year after it signed the CTBT. ZAC was an informal association initiated by Clade Zangger in 1971, with the main task of working for a "trigger list" of source of special fissionable materials, equipment and materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials. Under the guidance of Article III 2 of the NPT, parties within should ensure that all these items meet the requirements of the IAEA standards.^⑤

In 2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and became increasingly active in the NSG. The NSG further strengthened the export control by limiting the activity of the suppliers of nuclear weapons. According to its "Non-Proliferation Principle," a supplier could authorize a transfer only when "satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons." The committee aims at ensuring that "the rare but important cases where adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee that a state will consistently share the objectives of the treaty."^⑥

Through the history of China's participation in major international nuclear non-proliferation regimes, China's role in the international community has changed greatly. From the very beginning, it promoted its role in assisting the developing countries and achieving its international goal of total elimination of nuclear threat. The same efforts could be seen from its involvement in the international chemical and biological organizations.

2.2 China and Biological and Chemical-related Regimes

^① *Xinhua*, October 22, 1994, <http://www.xinhuanet.com>.

^② Banning N. Garrett, Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspective on Nuclear Arms Control," p. 54.

^③ *Beijing Review*, Vol. 36, No. 41, October 11-17, 1993, p. 10.

^④ Cited in Garrett, "Chinese Perspective," p. 55.

^⑤ NTI, "Zangger Committee (ZAC)," www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/zangger-committee-zac/.

^⑥ NSG, "About the NSG," www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en/about-us.

As a country with a history of being victim of biological and chemical weapons during the Anti-Japanese War in the World War II, China participated in major international organizations on biological and chemical weapons (BCWs). It acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1952 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1984. It then signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified it in 1997.

China has been consistent in its stance on BCWs. For example, the Chinese delegation at the 1991 BTWC Review Conference stated that, “of bacteriological weapons, China has always advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological weapons and pursues a policy of not developing, producing or stockpiling this type of weapons.”^① As a country with a large industry of chemical weapons, China put great effort in avoiding the proliferation of chemical weapons. Chinese then ambassador stated at the Third Review Conference of the CWC that China had submitted “all kinds of declarations on time and received over 300 inspections of different types successfully.”^②

China also worked actively with the international organization on protection and assistance on BCWs. In 2014, the Chinese government and the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) jointly hosted the Third Advanced Assistance and Protection Course at the Institute of Chemical Defense in Beijing. In May 2015, the two sides again hosted a Regional Meeting on Education and Outreach for State Parties in Asia in Beijing.^③

Nonetheless, China has not been a member of the Australia Group (AG), an organization set up to prevent the direct or inadvertent proliferation of CBWs. China criticized the AG’s discriminatory standards. In 2000, then Director-General of Arms Control & Disarmament of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, complained about the gap between CWC and the AG standards, saying that “conflicts between the relevant provisions of the Convention and those of the ‘Australia Group’ inevitably causes confusion and disputes in what otherwise be normal trade activities, results in a *de facto* imbalance in the rights enjoyed by individual States parties, undercuts authority of the Convention, discourages the participation of more countries in the Convention’s regime, and compromises its universality.”^④ In spite of its non-participation in the AG, China continued to talk with the AG in March 2004, March 2005, June 2006, June 2008 and May 2011.^⑤ The 2014 US reports on assessment of China’s biological weapons said that even though available information indicated that China engaged in dual-use biological activities, it did not verify that China was breaching the BWC.^⑥

^① “Position of Principle of the Chinese Delegation on the Biological Weapons Convention and its Third Review Conference,” Working Paper submitted by China, BWC Third Review Conference, BWC/CONF.III/18, September 20, 1991, www.opbw.org.

^② Xu Chen, “General Debate Statement by Ambassador Chen Xu, Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Third Review Conference on the Chemical Weapons Convention,” Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, April 8, 2013, www.opcw.org. See also NTI, “Chemical,” <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/chemical/>.

^③ NTI, “Chemical”. See also Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Third Advanced Assistance and Protection Course Held in China,” May 26-30, 2014, www.opcw.org.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Regional Meeting in Beijing on Education and Outreach for States Parties in Asia,” May 8, 2015, www.opcw.org.

^④ Cited in Jizhou Zhao, “Mapping China’s Place in Multilateral Export Control Regimes: Policy Implications for the European Union,” *NFG Working Paper*, 2013, p.13. See also Zukang Sha, “Next Steps (OPCW Synthesis),” Hague, 2000.

^⑤ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Australia Group,” www.fmprc.gov.cn.

^⑥ US Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” July 2014, www.state.gov.

2.3 China and Missile-related Regimes

Lastly, the country's participation in missile-related international regimes, namely the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), suggested that China's policy went through a similar change. At the outset, China criticized the MTCR as discriminatory because it allowed the developed countries to continue to sell other delivery systems such as combat aircrafts while restricting the selling of ballistic missiles in which developing countries, such as China had put tremendous investment.^①

However, such an attitude began to change from the 1990s onward; China gradually made efforts to embrace a more international acceptable standard toward missile export control. A huge change was seen in 2002 when China for the first time issued a policy paper entitled "Regimes of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List". The list was comprehensive and in some fields "even stricter than MTCR guidelines."^② At the Conference on Disarmament 2004, the first round of China-MTCR dialogues was held in Paris. Later, China expressed its willingness to join the MTCR during the second round of China-MTCR talks.^③ However, China's application is still under review to this day.

In sum, since the 1980s, China gradually accepted the international non-proliferation regimes, while the latter were discriminatory when referring to nuclear non-proliferation area or to the biochemical and missile non-proliferation. Although it is still not affiliated to the AG and MTCR, China's willingness and efforts to join them is self-evident.

2.4 China's National Arms Control Construction

In fact, throughout the years after the 1980s, China not only progressively agreed to international non-proliferation regimes in a broad sense, but also struggled to make its own national laws and policy papers to lessen the danger of proliferation of WMDs from state-owned enterprises and small private companies to other countries.

In 1995, China published its first government white paper on arms control and disarmament entitled "China: Arms Control and Disarmament". This paper reaffirmed the country's stance of the past years. It claimed that China supported IAEA safeguards and had "fully and conscientiously fulfilled its obligations" under the international regimes in the nuclear and biological sphere since it signed the NPT in 1992 and the BWC in 1984. It followed three principles regarding nuclear exports: exports serving peaceful use only, accepting IAEA's safeguards and no retransfers to a third country without China's consent. It consistently advocated complete prohibition and thorough destruction of biological and chemical weapons. Regarding the chemical export control, a detailed list of chemicals for export control had been completed in accordance with the Verification Annex of the convention. It further disclosed the institutions which were responsible for chemicals exports and their examination. Another evidence presented in this paper was its strong opposition towards the arms race between the US and the former Soviet Union and its firm support for the Third World countries in disarmament and non-proliferation activities.^④

Following this first government white paper on China's arms control and disarmament policy, the Chinese government issued subsequently every two years from 1998 to 2010

^① Di Hua, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in William C. Potter, Harlan W. Jencks, eds., *The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994, pp.168-172.

^② Phillip Saunders, "Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, September 6, 2002, www.nonproliferation.org.

^③ "The Second Round of China-MTCR Dialogue," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, June 2, 2004, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjwb_673085/zzjg_673183/jks_674633/jksxwlb_674635/t127757.shtml.

^④ "China: Arms Control and Disarmament," <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/index.htm>.

white papers, entitled “China’s National Defense”. In each of these white papers, there is always a special chapter dealing with China’s arms control and disarmament and China’s export control of sensitive and military equipment, including WMDs.

The first national defense paper which was issued in 1998 continued the general tone of the 1993 government paper and added its new policy after China joined the CTBT in 1996, and the CWC and the Zangger Committee in 1997. It continued to criticize the unsatisfying efforts undertaken by the US and Russia in disarmament programs and advocated for fair treatment towards the developing countries, and reaffirmed its stance in espousing the international non-proliferation regimes, mainly the NPT, the BWC, the CWC and the MTCR. To testify to China’s growing efforts to embrace the international standards on non-proliferation, the paper said that China continuously issued related regimes to strengthen its export control. In 1997, it issued the “Regimes of the People’s Republic of China on Nuclear Export Control” prohibiting any kind of assistance to nuclear facilities, which did not meet the IAEA requirements. In 1998, it published another paper called “Regimes on the Control of the Export of Dual-use Nuclear Materials and Related Technology”.^①

The 2000 national defense paper emphasized China, Russia and Belarus’s joint effort of sponsoring the Resolution on the Preservation of and Compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Meanwhile, it condemned the US government’s deployment of missile defense systems and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system with Japan. It strongly opposed to the TMD system and any incorporation of Taiwan into the system.^② Following this paper, the 2002 national defense paper highlighted a new major effort by the Chinese government on missile export control. In 2002, China formally promulgated the “Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies” and its control list. Moreover, the 2002 paper further expressed its acceptance of international non-proliferation regimes and the role of the UN, compared to its former stance on revising the current international discriminatory and imperialistic norms.^③

One year later, in 2003, with a focus on non-proliferation policy, the Chinese government issued a special white paper entitled “China’s Non-proliferation Policy and Measures”. This paper pinpointed the whole picture of China’s non-proliferation policy with five chapters, illustrating China’s basic stand on non-proliferation, China’s active participation in international non-proliferation efforts, China’s non-proliferation export control system, China’s concrete measures for non-proliferation export control and China’s implementation of the laws and regimes on non-proliferation export control. The opening paragraph of the paper stated that China had always “stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all kinds of WMDs... and resolutely opposed the proliferation of such weapons and their means of delivery.” Especially in terms of dual-use WMD materials, equipment and technologies, China called for “a proper stance between non-proliferation and international cooperation for peaceful use of the relevant high technologies, especially for the developing countries.”^④

Much different from the aforementioned national defense papers, this 2003 non-proliferation policy paper contained a thorough and detailed explanation of China’s new non-proliferation export control system. It stated that such a policy change was due to

① “China’s National Defense,” <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/guofang/guofang5.htm>.

② “China’s National Defense in 2000,” <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/2000guo/2000guo7.htm>.

③ “China’s National Defense in 2002,” <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/20021209/8.htm>.

④ “China’s Non-proliferation Policy and Measures,” <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/20031202/index.htm>.

China's new role in the international community after China's reform and opening-up policy and China's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). It explained China's comprehensive law-based control system on non-proliferation, such as export registration system, licensing system, end-user and end-use certification, list control method, "catch-all" principle, etc. In addition, it publicized its specific implementation measures on non-proliferation controls, including export control organs, the export examination system, investigation and handling of law violations.

The same basic stance consistently appeared in the 2004 national policy paper, adding "China's support for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)", which took the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a step further.^① Following the 2003 special paper on China's non-proliferation policy, the Chinese government issued another white paper entitled "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation". Except the contents which were iterated in former white papers, this paper re-emphasized the important role of the UN in consolidating international consensus for non-proliferation. It also stated that China's export control system and regimes were "basically identical with international standards."^②

The following three white papers on China's national defense continued the basic tone on non-proliferation with extra explanation on updated Chinese efforts in the field. The 2008 and 2010 white paper, for the first time talked about China's basic stance on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Iranian nuclear issue. It continued to promote China's policy on peacefully resolve the two issues with international cooperation.^③

In sum, throughout the history of the evolution of China's non-proliferation policy both in joining the international regimes and constructing its own national policy papers, China consistently adhered to its basic principles on non-proliferation in nuclear, biological and chemical and missile spheres. Its own policy construction and basic stance is inclined step by step to the international accepted standards. As advocated by Chinese officials, China always pursues "peace and development" which the Chinese government regards as the main theme of the current world.

Nevertheless, the allegations against China for exporting WMD-related materials and technologies never disappeared since the 1980s, mainly coming from the US. The Middle East is one of the biggest concerns regarding the receivers of Chinese export. The next part examines allegations on China's WMD-related exports to the Middle East since the establishment of the PRC, aiming at finding out China's implementation of its non-proliferation policies.

III. Claims on China's WMD-related Transfers to the Middle East

China's arms transfers to the Middle East started and reached apex in the 1980s and early 1990s when nearly 75% of Chinese arms were sold to the Middle East.^④ It was also during this period that China was accused, primarily by the US, of being involved in WMD-related transfers to the Middle East, mainly Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. With the

^① "China's National Defense in 2004," <http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/20041227/11.htm>.

^② "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation," <http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/zhuanti/book/956904.htm>.

^③ "China's National Defense in 2008," <http://download.china.cn/ch/pdf/090120.pdf>; "China's National Defense in 2010," http://www.china.com.cn/ch-book/2011-03/31/content_22263745.htm.

^④ Derived from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 479-82.

end of the Iran-Iraq War and the embargo imposed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait in 1991, China's arms sales to the Middle East dropped drastically.^① Nevertheless, the US accusations against China on WMD-related transfers never ceased.

This next part examines major US accusations about China's WMD-related transfers to the Middle East.

1. Nuclear-related Transfers

The first area of WMD-related transfers from China is related to the nuclear issue. The US government continuously reported suspicious Chinese transfers of nuclear materials and technology to the Middle East while the Chinese government never admitted any transactions of nuclear weapons or technology. Examining the US government reports, it is not hard to find that most of the US allegations were based on the American standards rather than the international ones. For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) report stated that "while any objectionable Chinese nuclear technology transfers to Iran may not violate the NPT, they may be in violation of the US laws."^②

Most of the suspected Chinese transfers of nuclear-related materials or technologies to the Middle East appeared in the 1980s. The allegations included Chinese technological support and nuclear materials provision. As early as 1988, according to US reports, 15 Iranian nuclear engineers had been secretly trained in China; that China and Iran had a clandestine nuclear cooperation program; and that China transferred technological supports to Esfahan for reactor construction.^③ The Chinese government denied the allegations and only admitted later in 1991 that China and Iran had "commercial" contracts in 1989 and 1991 to transfer an electromagnetic isotope separator (calutron) and a small nuclear reactor, only for "peaceful purposes."^④

The Chinese government's reply was supported later by the IAEA inspection result, suggesting that the American allegations were not tenable. In February 1992, an IAEA team paid a visit to Iran and did not find any Chinese supplies there. The US suspicion continued as China and Iran finally signed an agreement on "nuclear technology" cooperation on September 10, 1992 in which China claimed that it would assist in the construction of two 300-MW nuclear reactors in Iran and provide related technical training.^⑤ However, the deal was canceled for unknown reasons in 1995.^⑥

There were other controversial Chinese nuclear transfers with Iran. For instance, the CRS report stated that the China National Nuclear Energy Industry Cooperation planned to sell Iran a facility to convert uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride gas, which could be used for producing nuclear-related weapons. This deal succeeded because the US Westinghouse Electric Corporation wanted to sell equipment to the Chinese company.^⑦ The case illustrates the suspicious side of US policy: if China interferes with the US interests, every deal with Iran on nuclear-related materials or technologies could be "of concern"; while if

^① According to *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, during the period from 1988 to 1992, the arms sold to the Middle East composed only less than 30%, while that of Asia increased to 70%.

^② *Ibid.*, p. 29.

^③ *Ibid.* Also See Mark Hibbs, "Sino-Iranian Nuclear Pact Alleged," *Nucleonics Week*, May 2, 1991, p. 17-18.

^④ *Ibid.*, p.31. Also see "Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Assistance to Iran," *Xinhua*, November 4, 1991, p. 19.

^⑤ *Ibid.*, p. 31. Also see "Signs Nuclear Agreement," *Xinhua*, September 10, 1992, p. 15.

^⑥ *Ibid.*, p. 32. Also see Simon Beck, "Qian Line on Pledges Challenge," *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), October 4, 1995.

^⑦ *Ibid.*

the deal is interwoven with America's own interests, then the deal could be passed relatively easily. Hence, the US practices a double-standard policy.

In addition to Iran, there were other allegations about Chinese nuclear transfers to Algeria, Iraq, Syria and Egypt. In the case of Algeria, the *Washington Times* reported that China assisted Algeria in building a nuclear reactor which could be used as part of a weapons program.^① The *Sunday Times* estimated that based on the size of the cooling chimney, the facility could consist of a 40 MW reactor, capable of separating up to 8 kg of plutonium a year and in this rate Algeria could have fissile materials for a bomb by 1998.

^② However, according to Chinese statement, the contract between China and Algeria to build a small nuclear reactor in Ain Oussera in the Sahara Desert had been signed in 1983, but the reactor could be used only for peaceful purposes since its power was limited to 10-15 MW. China added that because the contract was signed before China joined the IAEA in 1984, it did not seek the IAEA safeguards. The case was not reported again since Algeria agreed to submit the reactor to regular IAEA supervision in 1992 even though it was not a member of the IAEA and it acceded to the NPT on January 12, 1995.^③

Allegations on Chinese nuclear-related transfers to Iraq, Syria and Egypt were even less convincing. Some reports claimed that a Chinese military reprocessing plant sold low-enriched uranium in the late 1970s to Iraq, and China conducted feasibility study in Iraq aiming to help the country to build a nuclear reactor in 1984-1986. However, there was no evidence showing that China continued construction of the reactor.^④ In the case of Syria, it is reported that China sold a small (30-kilowatt) nuclear reactor to the country as part of the IAEA technical assistance. Since this deal was of no importance to US interests and Syria later acceded to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, the case did not incur great concern.^⑤ Other unconfirmed allegations included Egypt's negotiation with China to buy a 300 MW power reactor to build its nuclear facility near Alexandria; a Saudi diplomat claimed that Beijing planned to sell Saudi Arabia a small nuclear research reactor.^⑥ Nonetheless, all these allegations did not cause much trouble under the safeguards of international non-proliferation regimes.

Following the climax of allegations of China's arms transfers to the Middle East from the 1980s to the 1990s, China was not exempted from US accusations on nuclear-related sales to the Middle East, particularly Iran. In 2002, the year when Iran's clandestine uranium enrichment plant at Natanz was disclosed, an Iranian opposition group stated that the country had procured nuclear materials from China while Chinese experts were working at Saghand and a centrifuge facility near Isfahan.^⑦ One year later, US news reported that Iran had used since 2000 the nuclear technologies from Pakistan, a country which received much of its nuclear technology from China.^⑧ Again in 2006, US diplomatic sources claimed that Iran had used uranium hexafluoride gas (UF 6) from China to accelerate its uranium enrichment program.^⑨

^① Bill Gertz, "China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Times*, April 11, 1991.

^② Cited from Shichor, "Chinese Factor," p. 171.

^③ Ibid.

^④ Kan, "Chinese Proliferation," pp. 33-34.

^⑤ Ibid.

^⑥ Cited from Shichor, "Chinese Factor," p. 172.

^⑦ Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," *Congressional Research Service*, January 5, 2015, p. 7. Also see *Washington Post*, December 19, 2002; February 20, 2003.

^⑧ Ibid. Also see *Nucleonics Week*, February 27; March 6, 2003.

^⑨ Ibid. Also see "Iran Using Chinese-made Feedstock for Enriched Uranium: Diplomats," *AFP*, May 18,

Moreover, the US continued to accuse Chinese companies of selling to Iran nuclear-related hardware. In 2007, a Chinese company was reported to sell Iran nuclear-related hardware, such as graphite, tungsten copper, tungsten powder, high-strength aluminum alloys and Maraging steel. In 2010, Zhejiang Ouhai Trade Corporation was reported to supply Iran with sensitive valves and vacuum gauges which could be used for uranium enrichment. However, the Chinese government denied all these allegations and the US failed to show convincing hard evidence.

In fact, China has answered the call of the international community to solve Iran's nuclear problem since its clandestine uranium enrichment facility was discovered in 2002. Along with other permanent UNSC members, China voted for UNSC Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1929 (2010) to impose sanctions on Iran.^①

2. Biological and Chemical-related Transfers

When it refers to biological and chemical weapons, the US has always exerted all possible effort to prevent any Chinese company selling related materials to the Middle East. For instance, the US Secretary of Defense reported that any Chinese transfer of chemical-related technologies to the Middle East could cause serious concerns for the US.^②

Reports on possible Chinese chemical transfers were made public, but again "unproven". One of the cases occurred in 1993 when Washington ordered the Chinese ship, Yin He, to return because it was suspected of heading for Iran carrying "at least 24 containers of thidiglycol and thionyl chloride, which could be used for mustard gas and nerve gas."^③ China refused to have the ship inspected at the beginning, but after the arrival of the US warships and airplanes and the US pressure on other countries of not allowing the ship to dock anyway, the Chinese government finally gave in and allowed a joint inspection team composed of Chinese, Saudi and US officials. However, the mentioned chemicals were not found.^④

In the 2000s, US reports continued to claim that Chinese companies were selling chemical materials to Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. The US government continuously imposed sanctions on Chinese citizens and companies.^⑤ Notwithstanding US continued allegations, the Chinese government made more and more efforts to control biological and chemical related transfers, including making public announcement about the export control violations. For instance, during 2006-2008, three companies (Zibo Chemet Equipment Company, Shanghai Smart Chemicals Ltd. and Jilin Tumen Chemical Light Manufacturing Company) were punished by the Chinese government for chemistry-related transfers to Iran and North Korea.^⑥ Even though it displayed the problems of the Chinese government's efforts on WMD-related exports, especially from private companies, it showed the Chinese government's promulgation of non-proliferation regimes.

3. Missile-related Transfers

At face value, the surface-to-surface missiles that China sold to other countries were conventional weapons, but since they function as non-conventional weapons' carriers, they caused great concern in the non-proliferation community as well.^⑦ The most well-known

2006; *Iranian Students News Agency*, May 19, 2006.

① Kan, "China and Proliferation," p. 7.

② Kan, "Chinese Proliferation," p. 34. Also see Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response".

③ Ibid.

④ Ibid.

⑤ See table 1 for China entities sanctioned for biological or chemical related transfers from the 1990s.

⑥ Lieggi, "From Proliferator to Model Citizen?" p. 40.

⑦ Some scholars consider them as semi-conventional weapons, see Yitzhak Shichor, "The Chinese Factor

case is the intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), DF-3 (*Dong Feng* or East Wind in Chinese) and named by the US as CSS-2 (Chinese Surface-to-Surface), sold to Iran in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq War. It was reported that the version of the missiles was a mobile, single-stage, liquid-fueled missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead of 1-3 megatons, or a payload of 2,150 kg, over a distance between 2,500 and 3,000 km.^①

According to the US government report, Saudi Prince Bandar claimed that China had modified the missile to carry conventional warheads. Chinese officials affirmed such a claim and said that the missiles were non-nuclear, conventional surface-to surface missiles and the Saudi government had made commitment of no transfer, no first use, and use only for defensive purposes.^②

Another case in missile sales from China during the 1980s was the short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) M-9 which US sources claimed was originally planned for transfer to Syria. The M-9 was a single-stage, solid-fuel, fully mobile missile with a range of 600 km. Syria was reported to have signed a contract and paid the deposits in 1988. According to US sources, Syria and Pakistan were the two countries which provided financial research and development funds for the M-9s. However, there was no information indicating that China had completed the transfer of the missiles to Syria. Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated in 1991 that nothing was planned for the sale of the M-9s.^③

US sources, however, claimed that China continued to deliver missile-related components or technologies to Syria, including 30 tons of chemicals which could be used for solid missile fuel and China's possible technological assistance in missile assembly in Syria. Suspects were also raised in 1996 on shipment by Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) of possible missile-related materials.^④ However, these allegations were not testified.

In the 2000s, the US continued its allegations on Chinese entities which supplied missile equipment to the Middle East, including medium-range ballistic missiles. A number of sanctions were imposed on Chinese entities which were allegedly linked to missile-related transfers to Iran, including a 2009 claim of a Chinese citizen Q. C. Chen's sale of a test chamber to Iran's Defense Industries Organization. Similar accusations were levelled against China because of its missile assistance to Syria's liquid fuel missile program.^⑤

From the major cases starting from the 1980s until recently, it can be seen that claims from the US about Chinese transferring WMD-related materials to the Middle East were not convincing. First, the allegations were not proven by confirmed sources due to lack of first-hand hard evidence, as shown in the Yin He accident. Second, even though some transactions were confirmed, the Chinese government never breaches international non-proliferation regimes or their standards. It is the US government that claims, inspects and sanctions Chinese entities involved in suspected proliferation activities, according to US standards rather than international ones.

in the Middle East Security Equation: An Israeli Perspective," in *China and Israel, 1948-1998: A Fifty Year Retrospective*, Westport CT: Praeger, Jonathan Goldstein, ed., 1999.

^① Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis," *Congressional Research Service*, 1996, p.14.

^② Ibid.

^③ Ibid.

^④ Ibid. Also see Bill Gertz, "CIA Suspects Chinese Firm of Syria Missile Aid," *Washington Times*, July 23, 1996, p.1.

^⑤ Kan, "Chinese Proliferation," p. 49.

IV. Conclusion

China's non-proliferation policy and its involvement in WMD-related activities are in line with its own changing domestic development and the international environment. Since its inauguration in 1949 to the end of the 1970s, China was trapped by its state-owned planned economy. It faced multiple problems with the newly established country's economy and breaking the international world's isolation as a communist state.

On the other hand, however, China would inevitably view the international non-proliferation regimes as imperialistic and discriminatory since they were formulated by Western powers which imposed great pressure on the newly established country. Thus, in the government statement, once China succeeded in testing its first nuclear bomb, it declared that the nuclear test aimed at "breaking the imperial monopoly" and China's success would be the first step for the ultimate achievement of world peace, especially for the developing countries since China would always stand by the Third World's side. As a result, the years before China's reform and opening-up at the close of the 1970s saw the country's nearly complete absence from the well-known international non-proliferation regimes. Moreover, even though China encouraged the developing countries to possess nuclear technology, it did so with the aim of eroding the Western powers' monopoly. Indeed, it never challenged the non-proliferation regimes by exporting WMD-related materials to other countries during the first twenty years of independence mainly because of its lack of ability and its domestic political and economic problems.

The non-proliferation situation in China suddenly changed with the implementation of the "reform and opening up" policy from the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. With the government's encouragement, this next period witnessed the rapid speed in China's economic growth, with more and more Chinese products being exported to the outside world and foreign investments growing in mainland China. At the same time, the Middle East during the 1980s and early 1990s was entrapped in various armed conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War in particular. During the wars, the Middle East became the biggest receiving market for China, absorbing more than 70% of Chinese arms export. After the Iran-Iraq War and international sanctions on major Chinese arms sales to countries like Iraq, China's share in the Middle East market shrank sharply. Nevertheless, China has since then opened its door to the international community.

Under such circumstances, the pressure from the international community on China to control its arms exports and join the international non-proliferation regimes became more and more urgent. Following the signing of the BWC in 1984, China gradually changed its attitude toward major international non-proliferation regimes and began to regard them as a necessary step to regional and world peace. The following years saw China's gradual integration into the international non-proliferation community. By 2015, China had joined the NPT (1992), the CTBT (1996), the ZAC (1997), the CWC (1997) and the NSG (2004). Although China is still not a member of the AG and the MTCR, it never discarded efforts to hold direct talks with the committee and pledged to abide by its standards. In addition, since the first government white paper on arms control and disarmament was issued in 1995, China continued to publish a series of national defense white papers and special white papers on non-proliferation and disarmament to further achieve its pledges of promoting final elimination of WMDs and world peace.

In fact, China's effort on non-proliferation is consistent with its tradition and the central government's position setting in the world. The paper adopts a three-dimensional

analysis on the issue, namely from perspectives of China, the US and the Middle East respectively.

From China's perspective, as a country with a 5000-years' history, China embraced and cherished the concept of "he" (和, peace). Scholars argue that such a tradition-Confucian Long Peace-with a strong antiwar cultural norm and a shared sense of community, guaranteed a peaceful East Asia in pre-Western times.^① In modern times, the rising power of China compels the Chinese government to seek an appropriate position in the world. With a rapidly developing economy and as a country with the world's largest population, China has gradually adopted its position as a great power in world politics and a developing country in the global economy. From the 1990s, China reckoned that the world has changed from being a bipolar world during the Cold War period, which saw numerous armed and non-armed conflicts between the US and the Soviet Union, and between the capitalist world and the communist world, to a period with the main theme of peace and development."

In 2011, the Information Office of the State Council of China published the white paper entitled "China's Peaceful Development". The paper specifies the path, aim, historical background and meaning of China's peaceful development. Accordingly, the Chinese government issued its foreign policies under the framework of peaceful development: promoting the building of a harmonious world; pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace; promoting new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination; actively living up to international responsibility and promoting regional cooperation and good-neighborly relations. Politically, countries, it said, "should respect each other and treat each other as equals and safeguard the UN's core role in handling global affairs, adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, abide by international law and the generally-accepted principles governing international relations."^②

In addition, the Chinese government in recent years has promoted several national concepts among the Chinese and the world. Such concepts that the government frequently mentioned in its white papers and international conferences include "being a responsible great power," "peaceful development," "harmonious world," and so on.^③ The signal behind all these concepts is that the main task for China is no longer class struggles, but economic construction. With the aim of setting up a good image of politically "great power" and economically "great power," and form a conducive environment for China's economic prosperity, it is rational for China to make efforts to integrate into the world community, including the non-proliferation sphere.

However, throughout the 1980s until today, the US government never ceased to claim that China was trying to export WMD-related materials and technologies to the Middle East. By closely examining these allegations, there is no doubt that most of the accusations were based on unconfirmed evidence. To further circumvent Chinese companies from transferring arms-related materials to the Middle East, the US has continuously imposed sanctions based on US laws rather than on international non-proliferation regimes. In other

^① David C. Kang, "Why Was There No Religious War in Premodern East Asia?" *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2014, pp. 965-986; Robert E. Kelly, "A 'Confucian Long Peace' in pre-Western East Asia?" *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2011, pp. 408-430.

^② "China's Peaceful Development," <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2011/Document/1000032/1000032.htm>.

^③ Fuzuo Wu, "China's Responses to External Pressures on its WMD-related Exports after 2004: Reactive and Proactive," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 24, No. 93, 2015, pp. 526-528.

words, the US, rather than the UN or other international regimes, was acting as an international policeman to inspect Chinese arms transfers.

Such a US role could have double results on the issue of China's participation in the non-proliferation sphere. On the one hand, the great pressure from the US, economic sanctions in particular, pushed the Chinese government and entities, to join the international non-proliferation regimes and strengthen China's national control on arms transfers, especially those related to WMDs. On the other hand, US pressure based on US national interests could generate more abhorrence from China, especially when it is linked with China's national interests, such as on the issue of Taiwan.

In 1992, for instance, China ended its participation in the "Arms Control in the Middle East" talks after being informed that George H. W. Bush had approved the sale of 150 F-16A/B fighters to Chinese Taiwan. Again in 1998 US-China Summit in Beijing, China asked the US to pledge not to sell defensive missiles to Chinese Taiwan, otherwise, China would not stop selling missiles to Iran. No agreement was reached. Words of an unnamed China Foreign Ministry official told the Associated Press on February 26, 2002 to provide an implicit explanation as to the problematic US policy toward China's non-proliferation policy. He said that the US "can't just accuse us of violating our commitments and at the same time, sell large amounts of arms to Taiwan," because such arms sales are "also a kind of proliferation."^① In sum, the double standards of the US policy could be the hindrance in promoting China's non-proliferation efforts, especially when the effectiveness of US economic sanctions was also put into question.^②

Lastly, from the perspective of the Middle East, it is reasonable to check China's interest in the area. Obviously, economic interests in the Middle East lie in the heart of China's non-proliferation policy. If China had great economic interests in the Middle East, its policy would be inevitably influenced by the Middle Eastern countries. Take Iran for example, this is the country from which around 50% of China's oil imports come from. China has invested a huge amount of money in Iran, especially in oil and gas exploitation.^③ As a result, even though China voted for UNSC sanctions on Iran, it did not agree to cut economic ties with Iran completely.

In fact, China's policy on Middle Eastern countries has its linkage to its stance towards the general third-world countries. From the first day since China successfully completed its nuclear test, it told the world that China would always stand for the developing countries. Thus, it advocates the peaceful use of high technology, nuclear technology included. This also explains the characteristics of part of China's exports to the Middle East: dual-use, i.e., military and peaceful usage. This characteristic also becomes the center of China-US disputes on arms export control and non-proliferation.

Nevertheless, since China is more and more integrated into the international community, it has made great progress in the non-proliferation area. Even though it may be involved in controversial arms transfers to the Middle East, it, in general, abides by the international rules and is seeking more international cooperation on non-proliferation. The US and the world should admit the progress that China has made and promote more

^① Kan, "China and Proliferation," p. 54.

^② Ibid.

^③ Ibid. For example, in 2004, China and Iran agreed to co-develop Iran's Yadavaran oil field in a project worth \$70 billion; in 2009, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a \$1.8 billion contract to develop Iran's North Azadegan oil field; in 2014, the China National Aero-technology International Engineering Corporation (CATIC) reportedly agreed to invest \$2.6 billion in two petrochemical plants in Bushehr.

peaceful negotiations on the issue of non-proliferation, which China always advocates in the international community.

Table 1. PRC Entities Sanctioned for Weapons Proliferation

Entity	Reasons: Statutes	Effective Dates
5 PRC citizens: - Liao Minglong-Tian Yi- Chen Qingchang (aka Q.C. Chen) - Pan Yongming - Shao Xingsheng 2 PRC companies: - Nanjing Chemical Industries Group - Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and Technology Import/Export Corp. 1 Hong Kong company: - Cheong Yee Ltd.	CW Proliferation: §81(c), Arms Export Control Act §11C(c), Export Administration Act (dual-use chemical precursors, equipment, and/or technology to Iran)	May 21, 1997
Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import/Export Corp.	CW/BW Proliferation: §3, Iran Nonproliferation Act	June 14, 2001 for two years
- Liyang Chemical Equipment - China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import/Export Co. - Q.C. Chen	CW/BW Proliferation: §3, Iran Nonproliferation Act (Australia Group controls)	January 16, 2002 for two years
- Jiangsu Yongli Chemicals and Technology Import Export Corp. - Q.C. Chen- China Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corp. - China National Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corp. - CMEC Machinery and Electric Equipment Import Export Co. - CMEC Machinery and Electrical Import Export Co. - China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import Export Co. - Wha Cheong Tai Co.- China Shipbuilding Trading Co.	Weapons Proliferation: §1604(b), Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act and §81(c), Arms Export Control Act §11C(c), Export Administration Act (chemical weapons technology to Iran)	July 9, 2002 for two years Sanctions were lifted on June 21, 2013, on China Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation, China National Machinery and Equipment Import Export Corporation, CMEC Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company, CMEC Machinery and Electrical Import Export Company, and China Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export Company.
-China National Electronic Import-Export Company -CATIC-Zibo Chemet Equipment Company	Weapons Proliferation: §3, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (transfers controlled under multilateral export control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or	December 28, 2006 for two years

	cruise or ballistic missiles)	
-CPMIEC -Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company Ltd. -Zibo Chemet Equipment Company	Weapons Proliferation: §3, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (transfers controlled under multilateral export control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)	April 17, 2007 for two years
-China Xinshidai Company -China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corporation -Huazhong CNC	Weapons Proliferation: §3, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (transfers controlled under multilateral export control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)	October 23, 2008 for two years
-Karl LEE -Dalian Sunny Industries (aka LIMMT (Dalian) Metallurgy and Minerals Co., LIMMT (Dalian) Economic and Trade Organization, Liaoning Industry and Trade Co.) -Shanghai Technical By-Products International (STBPI) -Zibo Chemet Equipment Company	Weapons Proliferation: §3, Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (transfers controlled under multilateral export control lists or having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missiles)	July 14, 2010 for two years

Adapted from Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," *Congressional Research Service*, 2013.