

# Assessing the Effectiveness of the Carrot and Stick Counter-terrorist Measure: A Comparison of Algeria and Yemen

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**Abstract:** *This article seeks to explain the differing counter-terrorist effects in Algeria and Yemen over the past two decades. While terrorism peaked in both countries in the late 1990s and incumbents in both countries responded with “carrot and stick” strategies, the results have been entirely different, with Yemen mired in deeper violence, whereas domestic terrorist forces were almost wiped out in Algeria in the late 2000s. To account for this variance and to measure the effects of the “carrot and stick” approach, the article adopts the state capacity model by analyzing how Bouteflika centralized Algeria’s bureaucracy and administration since 1999 which facilitated the communication between the intelligence, military and judiciary, thus strengthening military operations and law enforcement, and how Saleh’s Yemen filled with separatism and sectarianism aggravated the regime’s deficiencies of information collection and revenue concentration, leading to the continuation of terrorism. Evidence from my framework and cases suggest that coping with terrorist violence requires much more thoroughgoing measures than military blows; legislative efforts and national dialogues.*


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
*The study is not limited to the cases of Algeria and Yemen, but aims at shedding light on more countries confronted with terrorist threat.*

**Key Words:** *State Capacity; Counter-terrorism; Yemen; Algeria*

Yemen and Algeria were both confronted with terrorist threat brought by Al-Qaeda since the mid-1990s. In Algeria, terrorist groups sprouted against the backdrop of the *coup d'état* in January 1992 staged by military officials after the country's largest Islamist party, Islamic Salvation Front (*Front Islamique du Salut, FIS*), stood out in national elections that brought the party to the brink of ascending power (Takeyh, 2003: 62). In Yemen, homeland of Al-Qaeda's founder and ex-emir, Osama Ben Laden, terrorism rose and permeated the land as fierce conflicts between northerners and southerners created a "power vacuum". Although both countries sought to resist terrorist threats by the "stick and carrot" approach — launching harsh repression through legislative efforts and military blows on the one hand, and pardoned those militants who "pledged to respect the rights of non-Muslim foreigners living in Yemen or visiting it" (Schanzer, Jonathan, 2003) on the other, the outcomes were quite different. Whereas Algeria witnessed a conclusion of the civil war and remarkable decrease of terrorist attacks, Yemen's security predicament remained and increased throughout the 2000s (See Figure 1 and Figure 2).



Sources: Global Terrorism Data, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>



Sources: Trading Economics, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com>

The aim of this article is to account for the divergent outcomes of states' counter-terrorist actions by drawing on Skocpol's theoretical structure of state capacity. Briefly, I argue that coping with terrorist violence requires much more thoroughgoing measures than military blows and legislative efforts, as the Algerian case shows, abundant financial resources, higher bureaucratic efficiency, and greater territorial control facilitate states' implementation of military blows, national dialogues and other counter-terrorist methods. On the contrary, divisions within incumbents, deficiencies of information collection, weak revenue concentration and territorial control would hinder the states' counter-terrorist efforts, whether the incumbents adopt soft-line or hardline measures.

In doing so, the article makes three significant contributions. First of all, the article introduces the state capacity dimension to structure a research of Algeria and Yemen's counter-terrorist effects, which fulfills the shortfall of studies into both countries.

While a considerable amount of literature published on the two countries focus on Islam and Islamism (Bonney, 2009: 11; Brumberg, 1991: 58-71), human rights (Bouandel, 2002: 23-42; Lazreg, 1994), democratic transition (Entelis, 2011: 653-678;

Hermida, 1992: 13-17), there has generally been a dearth of analyses of Algeria and/or Yemen's safety management issue. The small number of publications devoted to it lay much emphasis on religious factors (Gray & Stockham, 2008; Hafez, 2008: 91) and international dimensions (Keenan, 2004: 475-496; Sharp, 2010). Both perspectives, though offering part of the picture needed to understand the background of the confrontation between terrorist-counter-terrorist forces, lack the evaluation of the counter-terrorist strategies and the framework to explain the safety management effects. The article aims to fill in this gap using the available literature on both countries by providing a comprehensive account of their counter-terrorism process in the 1990s and 2000s, and enriches comparative research on Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) cases.

Secondly, by using the state capacity approach to explain the experience of two countries, the article attempts to extend the application of state capacity model in security studies. Existing security literature pays close attention to micro-level strategies, such as decapitation (Johnston, 2012: 47-79; Jordan, 2009: 719-755), targeted killings (Downes, 2004: 277-294), conciliation (de Mesquita, 2003), cutting off financing resources (Clunan, 2006: 569-596; Gurulé, 2010), etc., but largely neglects the links between the socio-economic and political context, and specific strategies. This research tries to take a step in this direction. The approach used in this essay is not limited to the two cases mentioned in this article but can be leveraged to study more counter-terrorist cases in MENA, Southeastern, European, and other regions.

Thirdly, the research demonstrates that counter-terrorist efforts go far beyond hardline/soft-line methods, and legislative/military actions. It thus brings the attention to *why* certain strategies work or not rather than *whether* certain strategies work or not. Hence, it provides practicing leaders with an accessible tool to guide counter-terrorist actions.

The study begins with a discussion of state capacity's measurements and how it can affect "hard" and "soft" counter-terrorist actions. Then, to demonstrate my arguments, I intend to review the cases of Algeria and Yemen by looking to the outbreak of terrorism, the state's capacity building, the state's counter-terrorist strategies, and the counter-terrorist effects in both countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s. This article thus ends with an evaluation of Algeria and Yemen's current security situation, together with a consideration of my findings' implications for security improvement programs.

## **I. Theorizing the State Capacity Model**

It is reasonable to assume that hardline counter-terrorist strategies could lead to two types of results: 1) Weakening the effective strength of terrorist groups and thus frightening the militants away from launching more attacks; 2) Failing to wipe out the militants' capacity to fight and instigating more violent revenge. By the same token, soft-line counter-terrorist strategies can also end up with two possibilities: 1) Subjugating terrorist forces and facilitating national reconciliation; or, 2) indulging armed militants and breeding calamity for the future. Nonetheless, the question of "In what conditions could hardline or soft-line strategies bring which outcomes" is an important one but has been little discussed about. Here, I argue that state capacity plays a key role in determining diverse effects of both counter-terrorist strategies.

In fact, using the concept of "state capacity" to interpret insurgencies or civil conflicts is not uncommon in security studies. Yet, these works mostly emphasize certain facets of state capacity such as bureaucratic capacity (Hendrix & Young, 2014: 329-363), financial capacity (Enders & Sandler, 2006: 367-393), or military capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 75-90; Hendrix & Young, 2014:

329-363). Viewing state capacity as a whole composed of multiple fields, the study will bring together these important insights and observe state capacity from a comprehensive perspective.

As a multifaceted concept, various characteristics of state capacity have been investigated by economists, political scientists, sociologists, etc. Among the most seminal, comprehensive, and influential ones is the work of Theda Skocpol (Braithwaite, 2010: 311-319). She expanded Weber's state capacity framework by identifying five different indicators of state capacity 1) sovereign integrity, 2) financial resources, 3) loyal and skilled officials, 4) stable administrative-military control, and 5) authority and institutional mechanisms to employ resources (Skocpol, 1985: 3-43).


As Hendrix mentioned, "In either the repressive or accommodative response scenario, state capacity is central" (Hendrix & Young, 2014: 329-363). I argue that when the state demonstrates strong sovereign integrity, financial ability, official loyalty and skillfulness, authority to make use of resources, control of administrative and military forces, it would have more resources to equip the army, identify and track dissidents, and thus be more likely to constrain terrorist mobility and actions (Choi, 2010). Also, the country would be able to offer more welfare provisions to the society, which would not only reduce the cost for repentant militants to make a living, but alleviate social contradictions and reduce people's motivation to participate in anti-government violence as well. Besides, in certain cases, such as Algeria, the state pays attention to tracking and resettling released militants after they leave the prison and return to society.

Conversely, a weak state with fewer resources, less authority over territory, smaller administration and military controlling force, would be less capable of equipping and training the military, and might thus demonstrate weaker ability to identify targets. Meanwhile, a lack of financial ability would discourage such states

to offer welfare and track released militants.

Figure 3 describes the relationship between hard/soft strategies, state capacity and counter-terrorist outcomes.

**Figure 3: State Capacity and Divergent Patterns of Counter-terrorist Effects**



## II. "Carrot and Stick" Tactic in the Context of Strong State Capacity: Algeria

The landslide victory of the FIS, Algeria's largest Islamist party, in the country's first pluralist legislative election in

December 1991 by taking nearly half of the votes marked the rise of popular Islamism in Algeria and came as a shock to the incumbents, whose liberalization attempt merely aimed at creating “a pressure valve against mounting opposition during economic crises” (Lust-Okar & Jamal, 2002: 337-366) rather than forming real political rivals with the strength to seize the power they held. As FIS represented the Islamist tendency that aimed to revive the Islamic culture and thoughts through party politics and parliamentary elections, the negation of the electoral outcomes of 1991, together with the prohibition of the FIS by the military who seized power through *coup d'état* in early 1992 “removed a political outlet for Islamist energy” (Gray & Stockham, 2008) and corroborated radicalists’ faith that Islamic renaissance can only be achieved at the battlefield rather than at the ballot box. As a consequence, more and more FIS activists migrated to armed groups that “rejected democracy, the electoral process and the Algerian ruling regime altogether” (Hafez, 2004: 37-60) with an intention to take revenge.

The country was then mired in a brutal warfare between the army and dozens of militant Islamist groups that lasted for 10 years, and was scattered with various radical Islamist factions against the military government, with the Islamic Salvation Army (*Armée Islamique du Salut*, AIS) and Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé*, GIA) gaining predominance. Founded in 1994, AIS was a military wing of the dissolved FIS and was principally made up of former FIS members and sympathizers. Enraged by the regime’s harsh crackdown on FIS, AIS viewed government officials and security forces as major targets for violence, and aimed to retaliate against the authority. By comparison, GIA was more radical and brutal, as it adopted the *al-takfir* principle, regarding “those who did not share its convictions as apostates from Islam” as people that “could be legitimately killed” (Pham, 2011: 240-254). Yet, gory massacres of civilians initiated by the GIA

not only led to a decrease of public sympathy towards Islamism, but also caused divisions within the group itself and within the radicals' camp. Disagreeing with the strategies and tactics implemented by the GIA leadership, Hassan Hattab, a regional commander, established a breakaway group named the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (*Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*, GSPC). Adopting a middle ground between the FIS and the GIA, GSPC called for attacks against "civilians who pay their allegiance to French leaders" as well as Algerian military officials ("Algerian authorities arrest former FIS leader after Al-Jazeera interview," 2005). In reaction to the outbreak of civil war, the military adopted the eradicating method when it dominated the transition government in 1992-1995 by implementing a counterterrorism law and establishing a wide anti-terror network composed of People's National Army, security forces, gendarmerie, newly built special forces, and militias. However, in view of the large number of terrorist groups, abundant recruitment resources and sympathy base discontented with socioeconomic difficulties and the army's intervention in politics, early bloody crackdown met with little success. Terrorist incidents even increased from 216 in 1992 to 344 in 1997 ("Global Terrorism Database"). Only since late 1990s and especially in the 2000s, did anti-government violence start to witness a sharp decrease. This was not only because President Liamine Zeroual and his successor, Bouteflika, introduced more reconciliation methods epitomized by amnesty law in combination with hard approaches, but also because in 2000s, the occurrence of three events contributed to the strengthening of Algeria's state capacity.

Firstly, the increase of oil price in the late 1990s and 2000s elevated the country's ability to gather financial resources without imposing higher taxes. From 1992 through 1999, the international oil price witnessed overall rise but was characterized by

fluctuation and instability. Since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the oil price increased dramatically, while it climbed from \$40 to as much as \$140 per barrel in 2008 (Lowi, 2009), representing an increase rate of about 250%. Ranking 10<sup>th</sup> in the world in terms of natural gas reserves and 16<sup>th</sup> in oil reserves, Algeria's economy had long been dependent on hydrocarbons, accounting for roughly 60% of budget revenues ("The World Factbook"). The increase of international oil price soon brought buoyant revenue. The country's GDP climbed from \$46.94 billion in 1996 to \$134.98 billion in 2008, recording an increase rate of about 188% ("Trading Economics").

Additionally, by the 2000s, President Bouteflika gradually enhanced his control over the military and fostered a group of loyal officials. The coup of 1992 had brought to the front military officials who became the country's rulers during the transition period. Even after the transitional period ended in 1995 when the presidential system and pluralist party election were restored, military elites continued to dominate the country at the backstage (Zhang, 2016: 1-19). During the first few years after Bouteflika was elected as president in 1999, this bold and ambitious veteran who swore not to become a "three-quarter president" spared no efforts in his power struggle against the army and continually initiated military reshuffles to replace senior commanders with young officials loyal to Bouteflika. In July 2004, the power balance shifted further to the president as he replaced General Lamari, one of the most prominent figures that plotted the *coup d'état* in 1992, with the President's confidant, General Salah Ahmed Gaid as military Chief of Staff ("More Changes in Algerian Army, " 2004).

By the same token, Bouteflika implemented what Roberts called "dirigist approach" (Roberts, 2005) in order to reinforce the state's centralization. This was reflected in the Ministry of Interior's continual appointment and empowerment of their representatives at the regional level, expanding the administrative

controls in *communes* and *wilayas* (Roberts, 2005).

The benefits brought by the increase of Algerian state capacity were remarkable. Sufficient financial resources enabled the state to improve the treatments and equipment of the military and police. For instance, in December 2010, Bouteflika promised a pay raise of 50% for the majority of the state's 170,000 police officers. One year later, he increased the army's treatment by 40% (Volpi, 2013).

Along with Bouteflika's strengthening control over different institutions and institutional mechanisms to employ resources, the administration, military, gendarmerie, police and intelligence coordinated at the central level, while administrative institutes worked in with people's militia at a grass-roots level. The state's political and military leaders thus obtained a more complete intelligence picture of the insurgency, which enabled them to identify and destroy the stubborn armed Islamists opposed to surrendering in a number of cleanup operations since the mid-1990s, while cutting off the groups' logistical support networks, and tracking the actions of released "repentants".

Furthermore, an abundant fiscal resource also enabled the country to increase social welfare. Since 2003, the government allocated half of Algeria's petroleum revenue, or 13% of GDP, for social welfare (Martinez, 2012). Government subsidies ranged from fuels to staple products such as sugar, flour, milk, semolina, bread and the like. An increase of social welfare not only made it easier for released militants to make a living and weakened their motivation to conduct anti-government violence, but it helped alleviate the populace's social grievances and reduced the social base of terrorist groups, as well. According to official data, the proportion of unemployed population dropped from 34% to 11.8% within a 7-year period between 2001-2007, and the national minimum wage was raised from 1, 000 DZD in 1990 to 12, 000 DZD in 2007 (*Office National des Statistiques*).

In this context, the AIS took the lead in surrendering in September 1997 and was followed by militants from extreme groups of all hues. Although quite many activists of GIA and GSPC accepted the regime's amnesty offer, the leadership of both groups resisted in desperate struggle. From 2002 to 2005, Bouteflika launched several fixed-point clearing to GIA and GSPC's strongholds in Kabylie, Tébessa and Jijel. Badly weakened in the shootouts, a number of cadres of both groups were found dead, including GIA's emir, Antar Zouabri, and GSPC's head, Nabil Sahraoui (Bekkat, 2005; "Chronology Of Events: 2005", 2006: 279-308). In 2004, the expected number of remnant militants in Algeria was around 300 to 500 (Benchabane, 2006), according to Ali Tounsi, general director of the country's national safety, General Direction of National Safety. By 2005, the fortified points of GIA surrounding the capital were eliminated. And there left merely two support cells with around thirty members each in the country (Bekkat, 2005).

In order to maintain its strength to survive and thrive, GSPC sought support from international terrorist movements and built more affinity with Al-Qaeda. In a January 2007 message, GSPC's new leaders admitted its integration into Al-Qaeda and changed its name to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (*Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique*, AQMI). Meanwhile, throughout the late 2000s, AQMI was characterized by the tendency of what Roy termed as "deterritorialization" (Roy, 2004), as it moved their base to the Sahel and changing their targets from Algeria to neighboring countries, which indicated that extremist ideologies gradually lost the ground in Algeria and that terrorist groups could only seek survival space by stretching out of the country.

### **III. “Carrot and Stick” Tactic in the Context of Weak State Capacity: Yemen**

Yemen is the homeland of al-Qaeda’s founder and ex-emir, Osama Ben Laden. He started to train and finance *mujahedeen* (jihadists) in Yemen since the early 1990s (Koehler-Derrick, 2011) . The Yemeni civil war between pro-union northern forces and separatist southern ones in 1994 came to represent a golden opportunity for Al-Qaeda to take root in the country. A mass penetration into the southern governorates including Abyan, Shabwah, Hadhramaut and Lahij soon took place in the name of supporting the southerners against the Communist northerners. According to the testimonies of some former members, plenty of weapons were shipped from Khartoum and given by al-Qaeda to southern combatants during the civil war in Yemen (Koehler-Derrick, 2011). The Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda came to be known by its notorious bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and it was not until January 2009 that the branch officially announced its establishment under the name of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) after merging with Al-Qaeda’s Saudi branch.

Entering the 21<sup>st</sup> century, another important non-state armed group keen to initiate political violence became active. The group was first known as the Believing Youth founded by the Houthi brothers in 1992 in the Saada Governorate, aiming to revive Zaidi section of Islam and seek autonomy in the northwestern regions they occupied (Juneau, 2016: 647-663). Along with the growth of tensions between the Houthis and the Yemeni authority, the former which was increasingly politicized started to stage an armed insurgency in the north part of the country.

In general, the counter-terrorist strategies taken by Yemen shared much in common with those used by Algeria. Though President Ali Abdullah Saleh insisted that air raids and targeted attacks in collaboration with US troops were important and major

anti-terror means, more conciliatory approaches were introduced since 2003 which resulted in the pardon of hundreds of prisoners who were suspected of engaging in Al-Qaeda movement but pledged to adhere to Yemeni constitution and laws, and abandon the use of violence (Schanzer, Jonathan, 2003).

Nonetheless, the political and socioeconomic conditions under which Yemen launched counter-terrorist operations were quite different from those in Algeria. To begin with, Yemen was one of the poorest countries in MENA and had limited productive capacity. Unlike the Arab oil-producing countries, such as Algeria, Libya and the Gulf countries, Yemen had scarce oil and gas reserves, though income from oil production constituted 70 percent of government revenue. Apart from oil income, another important revenue of the country was migrant remittances earned by Yemeni laborers working in the Persian Gulf states. Nonetheless, the outbreak of the Iraq War in 2003 forced lots of Yemeni migrants to leave Iraq's neighboring regions, leading to a loss of \$1.8 billion in oil revenue and migrant remittances (Zhang, 2010: 103-104). Throughout 2003-2005, around 35% of the population was undernourished.

Besides, throughout the two decades following the Yemeni civil war in 1994 between northerners and southerners, the Yemeni military was perplexed with fierce divisions, posing important challenges for the authority to remain effective control over the military. The military was basically composed of three sections: 1) Section of Saleh. Members of this section mostly took key positions in the army due to their kinship ties with the President, such as President Saleh's half-brother, Yemeni Air Force commander Mohammed Saleh, and the President's nephew, Presidential Guard brigade commander Tariq Mohammed Abd'allah Saleh. This was the only section that showed loyalty to the President. 2) Section of Mohsen. General Ali Mohsen was a veteran of the Republican Guard of North Yemen in the 1960s. By

the late 1990s, he had formed his own power bloc (Phillips, 2008). Like Mohsen himself, most of his followers were the military officials with rich combat experience and disdained the Saleh family's nepotism and cronyism. 3) Southern officials. Unlike the first two sections composed of northern Zaydi believers, this section believed in Sunna Islam and was long expelled by military leadership, mostly consisting of northerners. Due to Saleh family's unpopular corruption and unfair treatment of different military sections, the army tended to disintegrate and the President gradually lost control of the faction of Mohsen and that of southern officials.

Furthermore, Yemen had profound tribal history and had been pitted with tribes and tribal federations such as Hashid and Bakil. Due to the political instability Yemen experienced for long periods of history, tribes came to function as states, providing stability and economic support for their members. At the time when Saleh became President of the Republic of Yemen, tribal politics remained and a patronage relationship was built between the state and plenty of tribes. In the north and northeast, for example, as Sana'a relied much on native tribal leaders to maintain regional order and bestowed their authority over to tribesmen, the central government demonstrated faint presence over these "states within a state". In the south or some mountainous and desert regions, such presence was further impeded either by separatist sentiment or geographical gap.

Unlike Algeria, the 1,700-km border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia had long been a channel for clandestine groups to smuggle people and weapons, posing important obstacles for Yemen to eliminate terrorist threats. Resulting from the powerful tribal politics and military splintering, the state's reach was limited throughout the hinterlands. To make matters worse, Yemen lacked public financing to enhance territorial controls over remote and bordering areas (Graff, 2010: 42-89), making them

vulnerable to terrorist influence. In addition, given the intra-elite fragmentation, lack of official loyalty, and shortage of budget, what manpower the state had could only exert limited functions in military blows. Likewise, unsatisfactory coordination between intelligence and different military sections led to the country's failure in formulating comprehensive programs to monitor and track detainees released under amnesty. Throughout the 2000s, Yemen witnessed increasing recidivism rate of "rependents". Among them, a large number left for Iraq to commit assaults against the Multi-National Force ("Country Reports," 2007).

Moreover, the state also lacked sufficient fiscal resources to narrow social rift by increasing social welfare, and was thus inept in weakening people's conviction that the "current system is corrupt and more open to ideologies-first steps towards embracing violent extremism" (Byman, 2009).

Hence, despite the decapitation of a few al-Qaeda and the Houthis' leaders, as well as the thwarting of several attack conspiracies (Johnsen, 2008), the hazardous security situation remained and had even deteriorated since the second half of the 2000s when the al-Qaeda branch rebounded in the south and the Houthi insurgency broke out in the north (Kobe, 2009).

#### **IV. Conclusion**

The comparative analysis in this article demonstrates that "carrot and stick" tactics alone does not necessarily contain terrorism. To examine the puzzle, I employ a general model which suggests that "carrot and stick" tactics against terrorism are more likely to take effect in countries with stronger state capacity - those that demonstrate sovereign integrity, financial ability, authority to make use of resources, and centralization of authority. On the contrary, as the case of Yemen demonstrates, the "carrot and stick" strategy would yield little success when implemented

by incumbents of a country characterized by separatism and tribalism, financial stress, intra-elite splintering, weak resource mobilization ability, and decentralization of authority.

While the strengthening of state capacity in Bouteflika's era contributed much to the decrease of Algeria's terrorist incidents in the 2000s, recent events pose potential challenges to the state's security. To begin with, the continual slump of oil prices since the second half of 2014 fueled Algerian economic instability. The country's GDP plummeted dramatically from \$213.518 billion in 2014 to \$166.839 billion in 2015 ("World Bank Data,"), representing a decrease rate of 22% within one year. The deterioration of the country's fiscal status made it increasingly difficult for the government to maintain its high military spending and subsidy expenditure (Fakir & Ghanem-Yazbeck, 2016).

Adding to the country's fiscal plight, a new round of fierce power struggle between the section of Bouteflika's young brother, Said Bouteflika, and the political general began in recent years which culminated in the abrupt reshuffle of ministers, military generals, and regional governors in July (Meddi, 2015), and the ousting of Mohamed Mediene who dominated the DRS for over 25 years in September (Jawad, 2015). An escalation of intra-elite wrestling may weaken the government's control over the military and the political institutions, as well as its resource mobilization ability.

Overall, this research points out the need to introduce more dimensions to assess counter-terrorist strategies. I argue that a country's state capacity reflected in its financial, administrative, territorial dimensions provides a more nuanced comprehension of counter-terrorist strategies and can explain more variability in the success of the "carrot and stick" tactic. Initial findings contribute to the long-lasting debate of whether "state weakness promotes terrorism" (Hendrix & Young, 2014: 329-363) in academia and decision-making circles by indicating that although state weakness

does not necessarily give rise to terrorism, it undermines the state's capacity of fighting terrorism.

There are important policy implications that can be derived from this study. Cross-country analysis on specific counter-terrorist strategies seems to be a misguided security study approach, particularly given the various contexts of each country. The Algerian and Yemeni cases show that similar tactics could lead to entirely different results. It is hence vital that policy makers consider under what conditions are hard or soft counter-terrorist strategies likely to succeed. It is also important that policy makers do not blindly import strategies that work well in other countries without evaluating the variation of socio-economic and political contexts.

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