Source: NORTHEAST ASIA FORUM, No. 4, 2025

Abstract: Equilibrium points in economic games between major powers vary, generating different equilibrium states. As per the framing effect, the cognitive framework of decision-makers can be divided into gain orientation and loss orientation, and players will exhibit different levels of satisfaction accordingly. Given this, there are three equilibrium states in economic games between major powers: enlarged cooperation，quasi-cooperation, and tougher cooperation. Since the Trump administration restarted the great power competition and intensified China-U.S. economic competition in 2017, the games between China and the U.S. on trade, science and technology, finance, and other non-strategic issues have evolved continuously. Two countries tend to maintain the status quo of cooperation, in games on strategic interests, while sustaining or expanding cooperation in games on specific non-strategic issues. Besides self-enforcing equilibrium points shaped by variations in the status quo of cooperation, the dialogues between the Chinese and American heads of state also play a key role in forming equilibrium points. Trump's re-election means that China may encounter intensified strategic competition and a new round of economic games. To handle this, China and the U.S. may need to prudently manage the economic games based on evolving realities. China, in particular, should accelerate high-standard opening up and foster new quality productive forces, thereby maintaining and consolidating its strategic resolve.

Keywords：Economic Games；Great Power Competition；Strategic Competition；Game Equilibrium；China-U.S. Relations