Professor Liu Zhongmin Interviewed by Observer on Iranian President Leahy's Visit to China
Publish time: 2023-02-18 Browsing times: 47

On February 18, 2023, Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University gave an interview to the Observer on Iranian President Leahy's visit to China, the full text of which is as follows.

 

Can Sino-Iranian cooperation help Iran overcome U.S. and Western sanctions?

 

From February 14 to 16, Iranian President Ibrahim Leahy visited China. The visit is not only the first visit to China after Leahy's inauguration as president in August 2021, but also the first time China receives a visit from a Middle Eastern country leader this year, releasing a strong signal of enhanced cooperation between China and Iran.

 

How to analyze the upgrading of China-Iran relations? Will cooperation with China succeed in helping Iran overcome Western sanctions? How does China weigh the impact of Sino-Iranian engagement on regional situations such as China's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries? Liu Zhongmin, vice president of the Middle East Society of China and professor of the Middle East Institute at Shangai, expressed his views to the Observer.

 

Observer: Iranian President Leahy opened a three-day trip to China on February 14. During his visit to China, the two sides issued the Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as the Statement), which talks about strategic relations, economic cooperation, international and regional issues, etc. What do you think are the highlights of this Statement?

 

Liu Zhongmin: There are three major highlights: The first highlight is the special background. In the current pattern of major power relations, geopolitical pattern and international order facing serious challenges, especially in the context of the current tension between China and Iran and the United States, China and Iran can issue such a joint statement, which will naturally attract a high degree of attention from the international community.

 

However, the West interpreted it as - China and Iran unite against the West. China and Iran have repeatedly reiterated that this is a natural consequence of the development of Sino-Iranian relations, that cooperation between the two countries is not directed at third parties, and that it is not U.S. pressure that has brought them together.

 

In recent years, Sino-Iranian relations have been advancing; in 2016, President Xi Jinping also visited Iran during his visit to the Middle East; in 2021, the two sides signed a comprehensive cooperation plan.

 

The development of China-Iran relations has its own logic and is not entirely influenced by U.S. pressure, but the current international and regional environment is special, especially the prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the uncertain future of the Iranian nuclear agreement, and the approach of Iran to Russia.

 

The Statement covers current major international and regional issues, and is both a historical continuation of the development of China-Iran relations and a response to the changes in the current international and regional situation.

 

The second highlight is the comprehensive content. The Statement covers all areas of relations, including politics, security and defense, economy and development, education and culture, and major international and regional issues.

 

On international and regional issues, the Statement addresses many issues, such as human rights, counter-terrorism, the Iranian nuclear agreement, security cooperation in the Gulf region, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, the Yemeni issue, the Ukraine issue and other very real regional hotspots.

 

The third highlight is to face the complex and realistic issues. The Statement did not shy away from some of the more complex real-life issues, and the two sides expressed consensus on some major international and regional issues. On the issue of core interests of both sides, both sides pledged to support each other in safeguarding national sovereignty and core interests.

 

For example, when it comes to security in the Persian Gulf region, Iran agrees with China's global security initiative; on the Iranian nuclear issue, the Statement is also clearer, directly pointing out that the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Iranian nuclear agreement is the root cause of the current situation.

 

Moreover, the statement implicitly criticizes the politicization of the IAEA by the U.S. and the West - both sides expressed their strong opposition to attempts by some countries to politicize the IAEA's monitoring of the agreement's implementation, noting that the agency's Director General should also perform his duties in strict accordance with the agency's principles.

 

The Statement addressed the Syrian issue and the Palestinian issue, two of the more prominent regional issues in the Middle East. In the context of the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria, the two sides emphasized the direction of a political solution to the Syrian issue. Currently, the United States has not lifted the sanctions against Syria, although it has given some assistance to Syria, which has created great difficulties for assistance.

 

The recent situation in Palestine is also quite serious. The Statement states that both sides support the just cause of the Palestinian people to regain their legitimate national rights. A rather long paragraph is devoted to Yemen, calling on all parties concerned to send humanitarian aid to Yemen, noting the need to stop interfering in Yemen, promote dialogue among Yemenis, etc.

 

Since the Yemeni issue involves Saudi Arabia and Iran and the complex relationship between the Yemeni government and the Houthis, the Statement actually conveys a message to the outside world that it does not in fact avoid the differences between the two sides, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and advocates resolving the Yemeni issue through dialogue.

 

Saudi Arabia and Iran have long had certain contradictions, but this visit of Leahy, who expressed his willingness to work with Arab countries to promote regional security, released a positive signal.

 

In addition, on Afghanistan, the Statement stressed the importance of maintaining stability in Afghanistan, which is right in the middle of China and Iran, and the stability of Afghanistan is closely related to China and Iran, and both sides expressed their willingness to cooperate on Afghanistan.

 

In addition, Iran welcomed China's initiative to expand the membership of BRICS. This sends a signal - Iran is likely to propose joining BRICS next. At the same time, Iran will play a bigger role within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization after joining it. All of these topics show the relevance of this Statement.

 

Observer: According to the data released by Iranian media, China is currently Iran's largest trading partner, and the trade volume between China and Iran is expected to exceed $30 billion in 2023. The visit, accompanied by the Iranian economy minister and the governor of the Central Bank, is considered by the outside world to have a strong economic overtone. Will the cooperation between China and Iran usher in substantial progress?

 

Liu Zhongmin: The statement reads, The two sides are willing to work together to implement the China-Iran comprehensive cooperation plan and continue to deepen cooperation in the fields of trade, agriculture, industry, renewable resources and infrastructure.

 

In addition, the 18th meeting of the China-Iran Joint Commission on Economy and Trade will be held in Tehran this year, and Iran has indicated that it will actively participate in import fairs, service trade fairs and economic and trade exhibitions held in China. The Belt and Road initiative and global development initiatives are also reflected in the Statement, and these should be the focus of future cooperation between the two countries.

 

At the same time, it is necessary to look at the issue of Sino-Iranian cooperation both in the long term and in the face of reality. In the long run, it is a general trend for China and Iran to strengthen economic and development cooperation, but it is also necessary to see the real difficulties.

 

For example, there is already a comprehensive cooperation plan in 2021, but the concrete progress of the comprehensive cooperation plan is not as fast and smooth as expected, mainly because Iran is under U.S. sanctions, the hegemonic position of the U.S. dollar and the pricing power of the U.S. dollar in the international commodity and energy sectors, especially the strengthening of U.S. sanctions against Iran are affecting the cooperation between the two sides.

 

Then, taking into account Iran's own situation, I see two possible trends for future cooperation.

 

The first one is that China and Iran put aside the U.S. sanctions. In this case, the two countries will have to create new mechanisms to advance yuan transactions, especially in the financial sector. After all, it is difficult to cooperate under the U.S.-led international mechanism, and the only way to fully advance cooperation is to explore new mechanisms.

 

Another trend is for China and Iran to achieve mutual understanding and move their cooperation forward step by step. It may be difficult for both sides to completely get rid of the U.S.-dominated international system within a certain period of time, and they can only keep exploring and seeking the possibility of establishing a new cooperation mechanism between them. In the face of the U.S., an important external obstacle to the development of China-Iran economic and trade relations, they cannot be too hasty in the context of the existing mechanism.

 

I think the second trend is more realistic. Both sides need to explore feasible ways of cooperation and also face up to the obstacles created by the U.S. side.

 

Observer: In the context of the second trend being more realistic and objective, would you consider the role of China-Iran cooperation, in helping Iran to overcome Western sanctions, to be less optimistic?

 

Liu Zhongmin: The current cooperation between China and Iran emphasizes more on strategic significance. From a strategic point of view, with the hopelessness of the Iran nuclear deal negotiations, the dramatic changes in the Middle East and the rising domestic pressure in Iran, strengthening comprehensive cooperation between China and Iran is still helpful to change the current situation of Iran. Even if the cooperation between the two sides faces more difficulties, the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries will bring certain benefits to Iran in the economic field.

 

Observer: Regarding President Leahy's visit to China, French newspaper Le Monde commented that this is a reinforcement of the anti-Western groups in Iran and China. How do you evaluate the attitude and approach of the U.S. and the West?

 

Liu Zhongmin: Since the third decade of the 21st century, the entire international landscape, the geopolitics of Eurasia, and major power relations have been undergoing profound changes, especially the U.S. The U.S. strategic focus has shifted from anti-terrorism to major power relations, resulting in significant changes in its foreign strategy.

 

Previously, the U.S. national security strategy focused on Russia, and in recent years has continued to enhance its strategic perception of China, and great power relations have been severely weakened in global governance cooperation.

 

The current international situation has two prominent manifestations, one is the prolonged confrontation between the United States and Russia over Ukraine, and the second is the continued decline in Sino-U.S. relations, especially the U.S. overreaction to the balloon incident, which has escalated strategic competition, although it has not led to a full-scale confrontation and conflict.

 

Since the crisis in Ukraine, the U.S. and the West have continued to extrapolate, trying to use the prophecy of U.S. geostrategic theorist Brzezinski in The Great Game of Chess - China, Russia, and Iran to unite against the West, using this theory to predict the possible direction of the future international system, and now China-Iran, Russia-Iran relations continue to strengthen, inevitably causing the U.S. and the West to use The new Cold War perspective.

 

The use of zero-sum game thinking to understand the current development of Sino-Russian, Sino-Iranian and Iranian-Russian relations reflects that the U.S. and the West have fallen into a serious polarization in strategic thinking.

 

On the one hand, they continue to group to form small circles, such as NATO's eastward expansion is an important source behind the crisis in Ukraine; in the Asia-Pacific region, the Indo-Pacific region against China, the United States pulled together Japan, India and Australia to form the so-called quadrilateral alliance, which is itself in order to In the Asia-Pacific region and the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. has brought together Japan, India and Australia to form the so-called Quadrilateral Alliance, which is itself laying the foundation for NATOization of the Asia-Pacific region.

 

In the Middle East, the U.S. is also putting together a Middle East version of NATO, such as the I2U2 mechanism (Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and India), although the results are not as good as expected. This is an important change in Eurasian geopolitics as the U.S. continues to form camps to counter Russia, China and Iran.

 

In fact, a contrast can be drawn between China's approach and that of the U.S. The U.S. cooperation with Western, Indo-Pacific, and Asia-Pacific countries is more in the nature of a military alliance for political and security purposes against strategic hypothetical enemies.

 

China and Iran are not a security-military alliance, but are more concerned with bilateral relations, politics, economics, culture, and the exchange of views on regional issues.

 

The U.S. continues to strengthen the system of regional alliances on the one hand, and on the other hand, makes excessive interpretations of the development of normal relations between other countries, which is one of the major reasons for the impact on global governance and regional hotspot issues in recent years.

 

Observer: In its dealings with the Middle East, China-Iran relations are also affected by the regional situation such as China's relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, how to balance the relationship between China and these countries?

 

Liu Zhongmin: China has its own long-term advantages in conducting relations with Middle Eastern countries, and China has no historical grudges such as colonial aggression and expansion and hegemonic expansion in the Middle East.

 

In terms of foreign policy tradition, China has long held the position of not interfering in internal affairs, not fostering regional proxies, and not pulling one faction to fight another, and China has maintained good relations with Arab countries, Iran, Turkey and Israel. Although the development of relations with Turkey and Israel is constrained by the West, relations with Iran must also take into account the relationship between Iran and Arab countries.

 

On the whole, China is more of an economic cooperation in the Middle East. Along with China's deepening involvement in political, security and regional affairs in the Middle East, some problems may arise in the future between China and different countries and regions in the Middle East, for which we should be ideologically prepared, and we should more clearly understand the complexity of the problems in the Middle East and prepare some response plans.

 

In a positive direction, China is facing the complexity of the Middle East rather than avoiding it. Last year's Joint Statement of the Cooperation and Development Summit of the People's Republic of China and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, which deals with the disputed issue of islands between the UAE and Iran, can be said to be a reflection of the demands of the Arab side, which has caused some discontent from Iran. The statement on Yemen in this Statement will also, to some extent, cause a reaction from the Saudi side. However, China will not provoke the contradiction between the two sides, instead it will do more to explain and support the dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

 

President Leahy made it very clear in the People's Daily article that Iran is willing to cooperate with Arab countries and he realizes that the future security of the Gulf cannot be achieved without the joint participation of Iran and Arab countries.

 

China has maintained good relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia and can play a role in communication between them. China is beginning to gradually recognize the complexity of the issue, which is an inescapable issue for China's future participation in Middle East affairs, and at the same time to see the pressure and challenges that dealing with the Middle East brings to us.

 

When China and Iran signed a cooperation agreement in 2021, Arab countries were also quite vocal; after the Sino-Arab Summit last year, there were some discordant voices on the Iranian side, but China was good at making positive adjustments, and after General Secretary Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi Arabia last year, followed by Vice Premier Hu Chunhua's visit to Iran, which was an approach to increase trust and clear doubts.

 

In the future, on security issues in the Middle East, if China can be a communicator, a coordinator, or even a mediator, it will contribute to security and stability in the Gulf region, which is precisely the embodiment of China's security concept - common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security.

 

Cooperation should not only face the problem squarely, but also liberate the mind and respond positively, among which dynamic coordination should be maintained to avoid China's imbalance between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, the interaction and exchange between China, Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years has been problem-free.

 

Source: Observer

 

(The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author or the interviewee and do not represent the position of this research institute)