On February 8, 2023, Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University published an opinion piece on 'Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent ①: Hezbollah in Lebanon' in the following article on The Paper.
Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent① : Hezbollah in Lebanon
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the export of revolution has been an important part of Iranian diplomacy, and Shi'ite Islam, a political organisation with sectarian ties to Iran, has been an important target of Iran's export of revolution. In this process, some Shiite political organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite organisation in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen have formed varying degrees of cooperation with Iran, and have been referred to by the West and some Middle Eastern countries as the Shiite Crescent. This is a unique phenomenon in Iranian diplomacy, a combination of Iran as a major power in the Middle East and a non-state actor, the Shiite political organisations. This phenomenon has been explained in academic circles by the exportation of revolution, sectarianism and proxy theories, all of which have been combined into a crescent theory, in which Iran, in the name of exporting the Islamic revolution, has fostered various Shiite religious organisations as proxies, thereby establishing the so-called Shiite Crescent sphere of influence. The sphere of influence of the so-called Shiite Crescent.
The export revolution theory argues that the core of Khomeini's ideology is to carry out an Islamic revolution in the world through export revolution and eventually establish an Islamic world order. The sectarianism theory holds that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a Shi'ite based theocracy, supports and fosters marginalised Shi'ite groups and organisations in Middle Eastern countries on the basis of sectarian identity, initiating political struggles and social movements against the current regime, thereby establishing Iran's sphere of influence in the Middle East and competing with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, representatives of Sunni Islam forces, for regional influence. The proxy theory argues that by fostering proxies Iran provides a platform for the export of its revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideology in the Middle East, by supporting proxies abroad who are committed to overthrowing pro-American regimes and using alternative regimes to achieve Iranian influence.
To a certain extent, the export revolution theory, sectarianism theory and proxy theory have their merits in observing and understanding Iranian diplomacy as a whole, but they also suffer from the flaws of being simplistic, schematic and conceptualised, ignoring the complexity and diversity of Iranian diplomacy. The main problem with the export revolution theory and sectarianism theory is that they overemphasise the role of ideological factors such as ideology and identity politics, ignoring the fact that Iran also has national interests based on strategic rationality; the proxy theory reduces the relationship between Iran and the Shi'ite forces it supports to a patron-proxy relationship, i.e. the activator-proxy relationship in the proxy strategy, but ignores the proxy relationship in a proxy strategy, but ignores the vast differences that arise from subjective and objective conditions. Therefore, only by comparing the environmental conditions, level of cooperation and results of Iran's relations with Shi'ite political organisations in the Middle East can the differences in Iran's relations with Shi'ite political organisations be understood relatively accurately, and this will undoubtedly help to understand the complexity of Iranian diplomacy. In view of this, the author uses the theory of patronage-agent relations as a perspective and takes the Shiite political organisations in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf Arab states as the main objects of analysis to conduct a comparative study of Iran's relations with Shiite political organisations in the Middle East.
What is the patronage-agent relationship: conceptual and theoretical elaboration
A brief discussion of the patron-agent relationship, and the concepts of agency and agent, is first presented here. A patron-agent relationship is a strategic partnership between a patron (sponsor) and an agent (proxy) based on some form of exchange of benefits. In international politics, a proxy strategy is primarily an interactive process in which an actor does not directly step in to gain political, security and other benefits, but rather has its interests served by a foreign proxy. There are two actors in proxy strategy, the aggressor (activator) and the proxy (proxy), and there are three indicators of the existence of the aggressor-proxy relationship: first, there is a direct assistance relationship between the aggressor and the proxy, and this assistance includes financing, training, sending weapons and equipment, military personnel transportation, and the aggressor directing the direction of the proxy's actions; second, there is a relationship between the proxy and the aggressor common enemy; and thirdly, the relationship between the agent and the aggressor is usually one of sustained rather than ad hoc cooperation.
In short, the sponsor-agent relationship is essentially characterised by two aspects: firstly, common interests are fundamental to sustaining the agency relationship, and once common interests are lost, the sponsor-agent relationship will be difficult to sustain; secondly, shared values help to establish and sustain the sponsor-agent relationship, but the parties to the sponsor-agent relationship do not necessarily have a common ideology to believe in, and the core of the agency relationship is common interests. .
In research on agency relationships, the sponsor, the agent, is also referred to as the benefactor, the patron, the principal and so on. The term 'combat' includes both conventional and unconventional warfare in the military sense, as well as acts of political violence and sabotage. An agent is an actor who, in return for the support of a patron and in order to realise his or her own interests, acts in the service of the patron through specific actions. In essence, the relationship between patron and agent is instrumental and based on 'mutual obligations and interests'. In international relations, both the sponsor and the agent can be either state or non-state actors, but in reality the sponsor is predominantly a state and the agent is predominantly a non-state actor.
The sponsor-agent relationship is established on the basis of an exchange of interests. Once this relationship is loosened or even disintegrated due to changes in the sponsor or agent unilaterally or bilaterally, it will lead to a crisis or even a collapse of the sponsor-agent relationship. In the event of a divergence of interests, the agent will no longer follow the patron's orders and deviate from the mutual agreement, or even subvert the strategic objectives of the patron. In the most extreme cases, the agent may even turn against the sponsor.
Crises in the sponsor-agent relationship are inextricably linked to the different environments and changing interests of both parties. When there are conflicting interests and significant changes in the strategic environment, such as regime change in the sponsoring country or conflict reconciliation in the agent's country, the agent and sponsor no longer see the sponsor-agent relationship as beneficial and will therefore choose to abandon the sponsor-agent relationship. In addition, changes in the political balance of power within the agent's country, particularly between the state regime and the anti-government group acting as a foreign agent, and changes in external interventions, can undermine the original sponsor-agent relationship. This is a very common problem, and therefore the management of the agency relationship by both parties to the sponsor-agent relationship, particularly the sponsor, is important and difficult. There are, of course, exceptional cases where the sponsor-agent relationship has moved towards strategic partnership after a long period of collaboration between the parties.
With regard to the relationship between Iran and the Shiite forces in the Middle East, the author holds the following three views in general: Firstly, the development of Iran's relationship with different Shiite political organisations is strongly conditioned by the environment in the countries where the latter are located, and the merits of the environment are an important factor in determining the success or failure of Iran's relationship with Shiite political organisations. Secondly, Iran's relations with Shi'ite political organisations are of varying levels, and there are forms of principal-agent relations with varying degrees of cooperation, which are subject to dynamic adjustment in accordance with changing environmental conditions; Shi'ite political organisations do not simply act as agents of Iran, but are also autonomous subjects with their own political ideas and interests. Thirdly, Iran's relations with Shi'ite political organisations in the Middle East have had both successes and failures; Iran has not exported revolution and sectarianism out of revolutionary fervour and identity politics, but has determined its policy choices in the light of environmental conditions and strategic objectives, particularly national interests.
Among Iran's patron-proxy relations with Shiite political organisations in the Middle East, Iran's relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon are the highest level of patron-proxy relations and have taken on the nature of a strategic partnership, while Iran's relations with other Shiite political organisations are mostly of a looser patron-proxy nature and have even failed due to their inability to establish patron-proxy relations. Only by comparing Iran's relations with different Shia political organisations, explaining the conditions for the establishment of patron-proxy relations and the differences between different patron-proxy relations, and revealing the differences in Iran's relations with different Middle Eastern Shia political organisations, can we avoid a simplistic and schematic understanding of Iranian diplomacy. A comparative study reveals that the necessary conditions for Iran to choose proxies among Shi'ite political organisations in the target countries include: firstly, the existence of Shi'ite political organisations that are seriously dissatisfied with the government; secondly, the existence of unrest due to the regional situation, the neighbouring situation or external interference and the struggle of Shi'ite political organisations against foreign interference; thirdly, the fragility of the state regime in the target countries, their inability to control the domestic situation and their difficulty in The third condition is that the regime in the target country is weak, unable to control the situation in the country and unable to suppress the Shiite political organisations, while Iran is able to subordinate one of the Shiite political organisations in the country to Iranian leadership. Of these three necessary conditions, the fragility of the target state is a sufficient condition for the success of Iran's proxy strategy.
Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon: a patron-proxy relationship with a strategic partnership
Among the Shi'ite political organisations in the Middle East, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon is at the highest level of hierarchy and level of strategic partnership in the form of a principal-proxy relationship. In the 1980s, by examining the environmental conditions in Lebanon, Iran chose Hezbollah as a proxy to foster and nurture among the many Shi'ite political organisations and developed their relationship from one of proxy to one of alliance, allowing Iran to play a major role in Lebanese politics and diplomacy through its long-term partnership with Hezbollah. With Iranian support and guidance, Hezbollah evolved from an underground resistance movement into a major political player in Lebanon. The evolution of Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran is also aptly described: in the 1980s, it would have been difficult to imagine Hezbollah evolving from a small, loose Shiite group in southern Lebanon to a savvy, multifaceted organisation with regional influence. At present, Hezbollah represents a state within a state. As the most powerful military, political and social actor in Lebanon, Hezbollah is not only a proxy for Iran, but a true partner of Iran.
It is often argued that 'Lebanon is where Iran has been most successful in exporting its revolution', and Iran's relationship with Hezbollah is a sign of this success. However, the evolution of Iran's relationship with Hezbollah from a patron-proxy relationship to a strategic partnership has been made possible by the fit between Iran's proxy strategy and the political environment in Lebanon, and is closely linked to both Iran's export of the revolution through the cultivation of proxies and the constant adaptation and optimisation of their relationship.
Iran's choice of Hezbollah as its proxy did not happen overnight, but rather through an examination of the political environment in Lebanon, which led to the selection of Hezbollah from among the many Shi'ite political organisations. In terms of the political environment, the political turmoil caused by sectarian tensions, the rise of the Shia population and its marginalisation, the presence of a large number of Shia political organisations, the fragility and decline of the state after the Lebanese civil war, and the Israeli invasion, constitute the objective conditions for Iran to establish proxies in Lebanon. The ideological proximity of Hezbollah to Iran led Iran to choose it as the most suitable Iranian proxy in Lebanon, replacing the Amal movement. As Hezbollah grew into a major political force in Lebanon, Iran's cooperation with the party grew and solidified, taking the relationship beyond a patron-proxy relationship to a strategic partnership.
Of the many Islamist organisations, why did Iran choose Hezbollah in Lebanon?
In general, the rise of Shi'ite political power in Lebanon has prepared the ground for Iran's choice of proxies, with Iran preferring the Islamist nature of Hezbollah to the secular nationalist Amal movement.
Since the 1960s, sectarian tensions have intensified in Lebanon and the rise of disaffected Shi'ite political forces. In 1974 Hussein el-Husseini and Musa al-Sadr led the first Shia political movement, the Movement of the Deprived. Movement of the Deprived, or AMAL, which marked a shift from passivity to political, social and military activism among the Lebanese Shia. AMAL, known as the Lebanese Resistance Group-Movement of the Deprived, is a Shi'ite based political and military hybrid. The name Amal is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym for Lebanese Resistance, AMAL, which coincides with the Arabic word for hope. It is also known as the Hope Movement, as it forms the Arabic word for hope.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian clerics contributed to the education and organisation of the Lebanese Shia community and trained Lebanese students in Iranian theological institutions, including Hassan Nasrallah, who later became the leader of Hezbollah. Hassan Nasrallah. During his time in Iran, Nasrallah studied the teachings of Khomeini, who later became Iran's supreme leader, and became a great admirer and advocate of Khomeini's ideas.
As the political voice of the Shi'a, the Amal Movement was essentially a nationalist organisation that defended Shi'a rights and opposed sectarianism internally, and advocated the independence and unity of Lebanon and the Palestinian cause externally. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran also supported the Amal Movement. In the early 1980s, Iran provided military training to the Amal movement to help it fight Israel, but this support was limited and short-term, as the Amal movement was not an attractive option for Iran. The reason for this is that the secular nationalist nature of the Amal Movement did not align it with the ideology of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and it also had to do with the Amal Movement's closer proximity to Syria at the time. Syria was occupying Lebanon at the time and had begun to invest in and cultivate Amal as a proxy.
Hezbollah is an Islamist organisation formed by those who broke away from the Amal Movement in 1982 and were also influenced by the export of revolutionary ideas from Iran. They parted company with Amal because they were disillusioned with the secular nature of the organisation. At the same time, Iran established the Association of the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon to promote the export of the revolution and to create a Shiite organisation following the Iranian revolutionary line to replace the moderate secular nationalist orientation of the Amal movement in Lebanon. The Iranian government's support for the formation of Hezbollah is therefore a major concern. Iran thus played an important role in the formation of Hezbollah. Hezbollah's ideology was compatible with Iranian Islamism, and its goal was to rid Lebanon of American and French control through revolution, to establish an Islamic government in Lebanon, and to accept Khomeini as its religious and political authority.
It is thus clear that in Iran's decision to support Hezbollah, 'Ideological affinity was a major factor in identifying potential partners'. After deciding to groom Hezbollah as a proxy, Iran began to provide systematic military and economic support to Hezbollah. In 1982, Iran sent an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of around 1,500 men deep into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to provide training and material support to Shi'ite groups such as Hezbollah. According to the literature, Iran spent around $50 million in the mid-1980s to help Lebanese militias.
The Lebanese civil war and Israeli invasion created opportunities for Iran
The Lebanese civil war that erupted in 1975 was in essence a product of the fragility of the Lebanese state, and the political turmoil and lack of authority it caused created the conditions for Iranian infiltration into Lebanon. For the Lebanese civil war was both a product of sectarian tensions and, at the same time, further exacerbated sectarian tensions and the existential plight of the Shiites. During the war, the inability of the Lebanese government to insulate the Shia from attacks from the Christian Maronites made it easier for the Shia community to receive external assistance.
In 1982, Israel launched a war of invasion into Lebanon, creating new opportunities for Iran to establish real influence and explore potential partnerships in Lebanon. Israel's entry into southern Lebanon and its support for the Christian Maronites further exacerbated the sectarian conflict in Lebanon. The invasion has particularly hurt the Shia community, sparking resentment against Israel and leaving the Shia in desperate need of a force that can protect their interests. The Israeli invasion thus opened up space for Iran to enter Lebanon and provided an opportunity to expand its influence, which it did by supporting Hezbollah, which represents Shia interests. Iran took advantage of the strong Shia discontent with Israel and seized the opportunity to deploy 5,000 members of the IRGC in Syria, then sent more than 1,500 into the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and mobilised Shia militias to form a new anti-Israeli force, thus laying the foundation for Hezbollah.
Long-term cooperation makes Iran and Hezbollah strategic partners
After the end of the Lebanese civil war, the long-standing cooperation between Iran and Hezbollah, particularly the mutual trust between the two sides at the ideological and strategic levels, led to a patron-proxy relationship of a strategic partnership.
In 1992, Hassan Nasrallah became Secretary-General of Hezbollah and Hezbollah stood for parliamentary elections for the first time, which were personally congratulated by Iran's religious leader Ali Khamenei. At the same time, Hezbollah has taken pragmatic steps to integrate itself into Lebanese political and social life by establishing a large number of social welfare institutions and providing social services. As Hezbollah matured, Iran also allowed it to make autonomous decisions. Iran's relationship with Hezbollah also became stronger, so much so that some studies suggest that by the mid-1990s, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah was more like a partnership and Iran had significantly increased its investment in Hezbollah. Some sources claim that between 1988 and 2002, Iran provided $96 million in aid to Lebanon through Hezbollah.
In an effort to expand Hezbollah's influence throughout the country, Iran also helped Hezbollah establish a television station and open a media relations office. At the same time, Iran continued to provide Hezbollah with ideological guidance, funding for its activities, military training, and weapons supplies. For example, in July 2000, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah visited Iran and was received by religious leader Khamenei; Nasrallah visited Iran again after Nejad was elected president in 2005. Other sources indicate that Iran has also provided significant arms assistance to Hezbollah and has trained Hezbollah forces in IRGC camps in Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad and Awash in Iran, and that thousands of Hezbollah militants have been trained in camps in Iran and Lebanon. Iran's support for Hezbollah is estimated to be $100-200 million per year.
The outbreak of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 not only greatly enhanced its political prestige in Lebanon and beyond, but also highlighted the success of Iran's proxy strategy. In the aftermath of the conflict, Iran also financed Hezbollah's reconstruction efforts, particularly through the provision of weapons to strengthen its military. By 2010, according to some sources, Hezbollah had at least 40,000 missiles, an increase of 166 per cent over the pre-2006 war period. In Iran's view, Hezbollah has become its most important regional partner, and even sees it as an important component of Iranian power. Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur, Iran's former ambassador to Syria, has made it clear that Hezbollah is part of Iranian rule ...... as a core component of Iran's security and military establishment, and the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah The relationship between them is far greater than that between the revolutionary regime and other revolutionary parties outside the country.
In short, Hezbollah has grown in strength with Iranian support. Israeli media suggest that from 2006 to 2016, Hezbollah's armed forces increased from around 20,000 to 45,000 (about half of the fighters are active duty and half are in reserve).
Hezbollah's cooperation with Iran in regional affairs, particularly in the Syrian crisis, following the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011, has led to a more strategic partnership. Hezbollah's joint support for the Syrian government of Bashar and its participation in the Syrian civil war in 2013 constituted another milestone in the Hezbollah-Iran partnership, while Hezbollah's military activities in Syria have greatly enhanced Iran's ability to protect the regime of Bashar al-Assad . Hezbollah has also played an important role in assisting Iran in its fight against the extremist group Islamic State, and Iran has used the Arabic language skills of Hezbollah members to help recruit and train Arab militants to fight the Islamic State.
The reasons for Hezbollah's role as the most successful Iranian proxy are complex and varied. On its part, Hezbollah's adherence to an Islamist ideology, Lebanon's sectarian political structure and fragile state authority, and its longstanding exposure to external threats from Israel have created a need for sustained external support; on the Iranian side, the selection and nurturing of ideologically close Hezbollah from among the many Shi'ite forces, the continued provision of all-round support to Hezbollah, and the granting of a greater degree of autonomy to the party have contributed to the success of Iran's proxy strategy. From the Iranian side, Iran and Hezbollah have a mutual need for each other, and their long-term cooperation on matters such as establishing and consolidating Hezbollah's domestic political position, confronting Israel, supporting the Bashar regime in Syria, and fighting the Islamic State has enabled both sides to maintain, consolidate and The patron-proxy relationship has evolved into a strategic partnership.
In essence, supporting Hezbollah allows Iran to ensure that a credible, pro-Iranian organisation has a significant influence on Lebanon. On a more symbolic level, Hezbollah's growth represents Iran's greatest achievement in exporting the revolution. The organisation's influence in Lebanon has provided Iran with a reputation, as well as fodder for Iranian hardliners and theorists to succeed.
Source: The Paper
(The views expressed in this article are those of the author or interviewees and do not represent the position of this research institution)
