On February 9, 2023, Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University published an opinion piece on 'Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent ②: The Shi'ite in Iraq' in the following article on The Paper.
Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent ②: The Shi'ites in Iraq
Given its geographic proximity and its predominantly Shia population, Iraq would have been the ideal country for Iran to choose a proxy, but in fact Iran has failed to find a strong proxy in Iraq. From Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 until the Iraq War in 2003, despite Iran's support for Shiite forces opposed to Saddam's regime, it did not have much success in cultivating proxies. It was only after the 2003 Iraq War that Iran's opportunities to invest in Iraqi proxies increased.
With the start of the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the rise of the extremist group Islamic State, which has plunged the country into serious turmoil, Iran's scope for proxies in Iraq has further expanded. In this context, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a group of various Shiite forces with which Iran had close ties in earlier years, became the main Iranian-backed proxy. But Iran's relationship with the PMF and other Shi'ite forces is essentially a loose principal-proxy relationship, not unlike Iran's influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The reasons for Iran's failure to produce Hezbollah-like proxies in Iraq are complex. Although there are many disaffected Shi'ite political organisations in Iraq, they have not been able to develop a Hezbollah-like dominant force due to deep divisions, such as within the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces, over whether to impose sharia rule as a political goal. Because of the complex historical and practical contradictions between Iran and Iraq, Iraqi Shi'ites, despite their common Shi'ite identity with Iran, have mostly opposed Iranian foreign intervention and resisted Iran's export of the revolution. In short, for all these reasons, Iran was unable to find a religious-political organisation that could integrate all the Shia forces in Iraq as a proxy, and had to maintain loose ties with many Shia political organisations and make dynamic adjustments according to the actual situation.
Saddam's regime: Iran's difficulties in fostering Iraqi proxies
During Saddam's regime, the oppressive rule of the Iraqi regime, the serious confrontation between the two sides during the Iran-Iraq war and the nationalist stance of Iraqi Shiites, who mostly held anti-Iranian positions, made it difficult for Iran to find suitable proxies, but Iran still supported some Shiite forces and laid a certain foundation for selecting and supporting proxies later.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Council (IRCC) was set up in 1981 with an umbrella structure to export the revolution and foster proxies, with branches covering the entire Islamic world, including The Supreme Committee of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was responsible for exporting the revolution to Iraq, worked closely with Iraqi Shi'ite organisations in their campaign against Saddam's regime. The exportation of the revolution from Iran coincided with the Shi'ite struggle against Saddam's regime in Iraq, creating links between Iran and the Shi'ite forces in Iraq.
Firstly, Iran had a significant influence on the long-established Iraqi Shiite force, the Dawa Party (originally meaning 'preaching', but also translated as the Calling Party, the Calling Party or the Calling Party in Iraq). Founded in 1958 by Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980) of the prominent Sadr family in Iraq, the Dawa was the first Shi'ite Islamist party in the history of the Middle East. He is also known as the Khomeini of Iraq and the first martyr of the Sadr family, and is widely admired by Iraqi Shiites. In the 1980s, the Dawa Party and other Shia parties were forced to move to Iran due to the repression of Saddam's regime. The party did not return to Iraq until after the 2003 Iraq war, and its leader, Nouri al- Maliki, was elected Prime Minister of Iraq in 2005.
Secondly, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iran provided sanctuary for Shiites and Kurds fleeing persecution by Saddam's regime and sent the IRGC into Iraq to train Shiite and Kurdish forces. Iran also supported the Iraqi Shi'ite Islamic Resistance, and the commanders of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), the group most closely associated with Iran after the 2003 Iraq war, were mostly members of the Islamic Resistance at the time.
In addition, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, founded in 1982, has long had close ties with Iran. It was founded during the Iran-Iraq war and received all its funding from Iran. The Council was in fact an exile organisation founded in Tehran with Iranian support. During Saddam's rule, the Council formed the Badr Brigades, an underground militia trained and armed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Badr Brigades launched several attacks from Iran into southern Iraq, mainly against Iraqi officials, and towards the end of the 1991 Gulf War, the group launched an unsuccessful uprising against Saddam.
After the 2003 Iraq War: Expanded opportunities for Iran to select and cultivate proxies
After the 2003 Iraq War, and particularly after the start of the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 and the emergence of ISIS in 2014, Iraq was plunged into a power vacuum due to severe unrest and the rise of Shi'ite forces, and Iran's influence in Iraq increased through its involvement in the fight against ISIS. Iran's increased influence over Iraq through its involvement in the fight against the Islamic State has expanded the opportunities for Iran to select and cultivate proxies.
With the fall of Saddam, the rapid rise of repressed Iraqi Shi'ites provided an opportunity for Iran to support the once repressed Shi'ite groups. The US policy of disbanding the Iraqi army and the folly of de-Baathification also facilitated Iran's influence in Iraq. As the US occupation sparked a Sunni Islamist insurgency, Iran seized the opportunity to invest in fighting Sunni Shia militias and finding proxies from them.
In 2011, the US withdrawal from Iraq created a new power vacuum and chaos in the country, creating more opportunities for Iran to find and cultivate proxies. After the emergence of ISIS in 2014, Iran played an important role in the campaign against ISIS, which also facilitated Iran's search for proxies in Iraq. In this context, the Dawa Party of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadrist faction of Muqtada al-Sadr, and the main Kurdish political parties have all received Iranian support. On the military front, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Brigade (IRGC-QF) and its commander Qasem Soleimani act as advisors in training Shi'ite militia groups.
Overall, Iran's strategic objectives and constraints in Iraq after the 2003 Iraq war are more complex. Iran does not want Iraq to become strong again and thus a threat to Iran, nor does it want Iraq to fall into serious unrest and thus threaten Iran's security and stability, nor does it want Iraq to become a frontline for the US to threaten Iran. Iran's influence in Iraq is constrained by the US domination of Iraqi politics, the country's fractured sectarian and ethnic structure, intra-Shia divisions, and the rivalry of regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Iraq. In this context, proxies can give Iran influence in Iraq and help it achieve its goals, but Iran's policy towards Iraq is clearly not just about finding and supporting Shia forces as proxies, but is more pragmatically realistic and opportunistic , even looking for investments among the Sunnis as well.
Iran's cautious and flexible proxies in Iraq
Iran's proxy strategy in Iraq is clearly different from the strategy of cultivating Hezbollah as the sole proxy and building alliances in Lebanon. Instead, it has cultivated proxy forces in both the political and military spheres, in line with the complex and diverse nature of Iraq's Shia forces and their constantly changing mix.
First, on the political front, Iran exerts influence over Iraqi politics by integrating Iraqi Shi'ite forces. However, due to the internal contradictions of the Shiite forces, it is difficult for Iran to create a unified pro-Iranian Shiite political force in Iraq, and it even has to face the reality that some Shiite forces oppose following the rule of Iranian jurists and oppose Iranian foreign intervention, and forces Iran to adopt a realist strategy of downplaying ideology and looking for proxies among multiple forces or even from outside the Shiite community.
Iran exerted its influence on the Iraqi government by supporting the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), a Shiite bloc, to gain an advantage in parliamentary elections and government formation. The early United Iraqi Alliance included essentially all of the major Shiite factions, namely the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Dawa Party and the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr. In Iraq's first parliamentary elections in December 2005, the Iraqi Unity Coalition won 128 out of 275 seats, which gave it an advantage in the government, such as the election of Nuri al-Maliki, the senior leader of the Dawa Party, and the election of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Sadrist Movement to a number of ministerial posts. won several ministerial posts, etc.
It is important to focus here on the Sadrist movement. Both the Sadrist movement and the Dawa Party were founded by the Sadr family, a Shia family. After the founder of the Dawa Party, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, was executed by Saddam's regime and the Dawa Party was transferred to Iran, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's cousin Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr (1943-1999) continued to lead the Shiite struggle against Saddam's regime in Iraq, leading a Shiite force known as the Sadr Movement or Sadr. The Shiite forces under his leadership were known as the Sadrist movement or Sadrist forces. After the assassination of Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999, his son, Muqtada al-Sadr, continued to lead the movement. In terms of political ideology, the Sadrist movement has maintained both an Islamist line of Shariah rule and an Iraqi nationalism that transcends sectarian differences, as well as an anti-American line. In its attitude towards Iran, it accepts Iranian support and maintains ties with Iran, but also maintains its independence.
This shows that the Shi'ite forces in Iraq are not monolithic, and if their relationship with Iran is the main factor to be considered, their differences are mainly internal as to whether they adhere to the Iranian Islamist line of jurist rule, and external as to their attitude towards the intervention of the US, Iran and other external forces. These differences are more evident between the Dawa Party and the Sadrist movement. The Dawa Party, although also opposed to US intervention, basically accepts the US political arrangements and pursues a federal, secular and democratic political line, while at the same time being unable to exclude Iranian influence. The Sadrist movement adheres to an Islamist line of Shariah rule, but at the same time maintains a nationalist policy of opposition to US and Iranian intervention, and later broke away from the Iraqi Unity Coalition to stand alone in the parliamentary elections and came first in the 2021 parliamentary elections (failing to form a cabinet for various complicated reasons).
It is therefore difficult for Iraqi Shiites to form a lasting unifying force and for Iran to impose its desired policy outcome on Iraq. In this context, Iran not only has to maintain a flexible relationship with Iraqi Shi'ites, but also supports Iraq's Sunni, Kurdish forces. In short, ideological affinity is not an absolute prerequisite for Iran's choice of proxies. Iran can only support as many different Iraqi organisations as possible ...... to maximise the opportunity to establish a cooperative relationship with whatever forces gain power in Iraq.
Secondly, on the military front, Iran has mainly used the fight against ISIS to bring together a large number of Shia paramilitary and militia groups under the banner of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq through the IRGC, but it has also been unable to avoid The divisions between the Shi'a forces within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) were not avoided, and a flexible and pragmatic proxy strategy was adopted.
According to the study, the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq consist of 67 militias, of which some 40 are closely linked to Iran's IRGC Al-Quds Brigade. 'ib Ahl al-Haq), the Badr Organization and the Kata'ib Hizballah Brigade. The loyalty of these 40-odd militias to Iran varies considerably, but the militias with the strongest ties to Iran tend to be groups that tend to support the rule of Iranian jurists and recognise that Iran's supreme leader is also their own religious leader. The ideological contradictions of Iraq's Shia political organisations also permeate the Popular Mobilisation Forces, and their differences overlap with those of the political organisations, mainly over whether to support the imitation of Iranian jurist rule in Iraq, and whether to accept or oppose Iranian involvement in Iraq.
In November 2016, the Popular Mobilisation Forces were integrated into the Iraqi security forces by law, thus giving them the power to In November 2016, the Popular Mobilisation Forces were incorporated into the Iraqi security forces by law, thus giving them the legitimacy to last beyond the defeat of the Islamic State. This further enhances the potential value of the Popular Mobilisation Forces to Iran, as it provides a channel for Iranian influence over the Iraqi security forces.
Iran and Iraqi Shia political organisations: a loose and flexible patron-proxy relationship
Iran's patron-proxy relationship with Iraqi Shi'ite political organisations is characterised by a pluralistic, loose, flexible and pragmatic approach, which manifests itself in a number of ways and for a number of reasons.
Firstly, Iraqi Shi'ite political organisations are divided around whether or not to impose a jurist rule modelled on Iran's, and Iran is mindful of the ideological orientation of different Iraqi Shi'ite political organisations, but does not deliberately seek out and support proxies on this line. The problem Iran has to face is also precisely what one Iraqi Shi'ite MP said: There are many differences between Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ites: we want democracy, they want Islamic rule. The Iraqi Shia religious leader Ali al-Sistani has made it clear that I will not allow the Iranian experience to be replicated in Iraq. The reason for this is that although Sistani was born in Iran, his philosophy of governance is markedly different from that of Iran. While Iranian religious leader Khomeini was a political activist, advocating the rule of jurists and the establishment of an Islamic regime, Sistani did not advocate political participation, but an active role for religious scholars (ulema) in the social and legal spheres.
Secondly, there is a strong nationalist sentiment in Iraqi Shi'ite political organisations. The historical grudge between Iraq and Iran has led to different attitudes and psychologies of opposition, resistance, antipathy and suspicion towards Iranian intervention in Iraq's Shia political organisations, preventing Iran from creating political and military proxies in Iraq that are highly unified and loyal to Iran. This is also exactly what the commentary says: Iran has influence with some, but not with others. Most Shias do not support the Iranian regime, and they are not Persian. There is deep animosity between Arabs and Persians.
Third, Iran's proxy strategy in Iraq is to invest in any Iraqi organisation willing to accept its financial and material support. This strategy, despite the risks involved, enables Iran to engage extensively in Iraq, while avoiding picking winners or losers in the face of uncertainty about Iraq's future, while also sidestepping internal Iraqi political divisions. This strategy allows Iran to have a wide range of clients with different capabilities and strengths.
Source: The Paper
(The views expressed in this article are those of the author or interviewees and do not represent the position of this research institution)
