On 10 February 2023, Professor Liu Zhongmin of the Middle East Studies Institute of Shanghai International Studies University published an opinion piece on 'Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent ④: The Three Gulf States' on The Paper, which reads as follows.
Iran and the Shi'ite Crescent ④: The Three Gulf States
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Gulf Arab states were the target of Iran's export of revolution and its opposition to the monarchy in the Gulf states, as well as the presence of a certain number of politically and economically marginalized Shiite Islamists in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, and its support for Shiite political opposition groups as a means of infiltrating the Gulf states. The Gulf Arab states were the target of Iran's export of revolution and its support for Shia political opposition groups as a means of infiltration into the Gulf states. However, as the Gulf Arab states had more secure regimes and stronger security controls, the Shi'ite political organisations supported by Iran either suffered blows and tended to disappear, or reconciled with the regimes and gave up their struggle. As a result, Iran's efforts to export revolutions and seek proxies by supporting Shia political organisations in the Gulf states since the 1980s have largely ended in failure.
During the Arab Spring of 2011, Bahrain saw a renewed wave of popular protests by the Shia political opposition against the Sunni royal family, influenced by the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and the struggle between the Sunni regime and the Shia opposition in Bahrain was seen by outsiders as part of the Saudi-Iranian proxy rivalry. However, the wave of popular protests in Bahrain ultimately ended in failure due to the Saudi military presence in the name of the Gulf Cooperation Council to suppress the Bahraini Shia protests and Iran's limited practical support for the Bahraini Shia. As a result, Iran continued to fail to cultivate proxies and establish patron-proxy relationships during the 2011 wave of protests in Bahrain.
Iran's efforts to establish patron-proxy relations in the Gulf Arab states have yielded little in comparison to Iran's success in establishing and maintaining patron-proxy relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is a strategic alliance, and Iran's initial establishment of patron-proxy relations with Shiite political organisations in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. The reasons for this discrepancy are also one of the key issues of concern to the author. From the author's proposal on the conditions for the establishment of patron-proxy relations, the Gulf Arab states do not have conditions such as state fragility and external intervention, except for the existence of Shiite opposition groups, while the strong state of the Gulf states, the collective security mechanism of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the security patronage of the US all constitute huge obstacles for Iran to implement its proxy The strong state of the Gulf states, the collective security mechanism of the GCC, and the security patronage of the US all constitute significant obstacles to Iran's proxy strategy. As the six Gulf states are mainly Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, which have a certain number of Shi'ites, the analysis below focuses on them.
Iran's Proxy Potential: Marginalised Shi'ites in the Gulf Arab States
The Gulf Arab states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait all have, to varying degrees, marginalised and disaffected Shi'a and their political opposition groups, making it possible for Iran to establish patron-proxy relationships in these states.
Saudi Arabia's Shi'ites, who make up 10-15% of the population and are concentrated in the eastern provinces bordering the Persian Gulf, have long been marginalised in the Saudi political economy. Religiously, in the eyes of Saudi Wahhabis, Shia religious beliefs and practices are not in line with the spirit of Islam, and the Muslim identity of Shia believers has never been officially recognised, with severe restrictions on their religious life, mosque construction and the development of religious educational institutions. Without equal status with other Wahhabi nationals, Shias are marginalised in the political, economic and educational spheres of the country.
Bahrain's Shias constitute the absolute majority of the population, at around 70%, but power has long been in the hands of the Sunni royal family. From the 3rd to the 19th century, Bahrain was under the successive rule of the Persian vassal kingdom of Hira, the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties of the Arab Empire, the Safavid dynasty of Persia (during which the Shiites were dominant), the Sunni Khalifa family (in which the Sunnis were dominant) and the British, and both Shiites and Sunnis were once dominant. However, after the Sunni Khalifa family established their rule over Bahrain in 1783, the Sunnis became the ruling class in Bahrain and have remained so ever since. The Khalifa family, with its strong religious influence from the Saudi Wahhabis, has generally rejected and distrusted the Shi'a. The Shi'a have also been excluded politically, and have been denied access to government posts, particularly the most heavily employed ministries of the interior and security; the government's restrictive measures on land use, housing and other aspects of social life have further contributed to the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divisions.
In Kuwait, where Shias make up around 30 per cent of the population, relations between Sunnis and Shias are relatively good, with both enjoying roughly equal treatment as citizens, but Shias are still of lower status than Sunnis and rarely hold key positions in the diplomatic service or defence establishment.
In short, the marginalised position of the Shia community in the Gulf provides a clear opportunity for Iran. The success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran has clearly attracted many Shia in the Gulf and offers these communities the prospect of an alternative to the status quo and an end to their long-standing marginalisation. Given the proximity of the Gulf states to Iran and their strategic value in terms of energy and maritime access, the successful nurturing of proxies would be of particular value to Iran in terms of strategic and economic interests.
The 'strong state' nature of the Gulf Arab states is not conducive to Iranian proxies
Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a number of Shia political organisations have emerged in the Gulf Arab states under Iranian influence and support, but the 'strong state' nature of authoritarian rule in the Gulf monarchies has given the state power a strong ability to suppress and integrate Shia political organisations, which constitutes a strong backing to prevent or disrupt Iran's proxy strategy. This constitutes a strong backing to hinder or disrupt Iran's proxy strategy.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran began to strengthen its export of the revolution to the Gulf states in terms of ideological propaganda and organisational building, with Shi'ites and their political organisations dissatisfied with the status quo being Iran's key grip on the Gulf Arab states. For example, the use of mosques and Shia clerics in the Gulf to expand their influence and the highly politicised preaching of selected and trained Shia clerics, and the use of Radio Tehran to enhance radio propaganda in the Gulf states, are all measures taken by Iranian measures.
In 1981, the Islamic Revolutionary Council was established as an umbrella organisation with five branches, namely the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Society of Iraq, the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Society of Lebanon and the Islamic Revolutionary Council of Iraq. The Islamic Revolutionary Association of Iraq, Islamic Revolutionary Association of Lebanon, Islamic Revolutionary Association of the Arabian Peninsula, Islamic Revolutionary Association of Africa and the Maghreb The Islamic Revolutionary Association of the Arabian Peninsula (IRAP) is responsible for leading the activities of Islamic organisations, particularly Shia organisations, in the Gulf countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, where Shia political opponents in these countries have joined the organisation and have received leadership and training from Iran.
In Saudi Arabia, Iran initially supported The Islamic Revolution in the Arab Peninsula (IRAP), which was established under the influence of the Iranian revolution. However, when the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula was softened up by the Saudi government in the 1980s and abandoned its military confrontation with the Saudi government, Iran turned its support to Hizballah al-Hijaz, a group of exiled Iranians. ), a group led by Saudi Shi'ite clerics in exile in Iran, which Iran has also found to be more militant. Shia political organisations in Saudi Arabia have also engaged in political resistance, including struggles for rights, demonstrations and violence, and have responded to the challenge of Iranian-backed Shia political organisations with a combination of heavy-handed repression, security controls, political and economic and social reforms, and religious dialogue. Although Shi'ite political organisations with an Iranian background, such as Hezbollah, have not abandoned their attempts to overthrow the Saudi regime, they have not become Iranian proxies that pose a serious threat to the Saudis.
In Bahrain, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) is the most representative Shi'ite political organisation established under the influence of the Iranian revolution. Based in mosques and Shia religious institutions, the group mobilises politically while explicitly supporting Iran's Khomeini doctrine and advocating an 'Islamic revolution' in Bahrain. In December 1981, the Bahrain Islamic Liberation Front (BILF) used Iranian-trained personnel to plan a coup, which was thwarted by the Bahraini government. By the end of the last century, the Iranian-based Bahrain Islamic Liberation Front (BIF) had a limited presence in Bahrain after the Bahraini government cracked down on it.
In Kuwait, where Shi'ite rights are better treated and no typical Shi'ite political organisation has emerged, the influence of radical Shi'ite groups from Lebanon, Iraq and other Gulf Arab states, such as the Islamic Jihad Group, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Hijazi Brigades, and the Shi'ite militant organisations, has been prominent. Brigades, the Holy War Organization in the Hijaz, and the Soldiers of Justice. The most typical incident was the hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane bound for Tehran in 1984. In addition, the attempted attack on the Great Mosque in Mecca in 1989 led to the discovery of the organisation Hizballah Kuwai, but nothing else is known about this organisation. In short, despite the violent attacks in Kuwait, none of these organisations became real partners of Iran and their value proved short-lived and not only did they not have lasting strategic value for Iran, but actually became used by the Gulf authorities to suppress Shi'ite radicalism.
In addition, in the 1980s, there were a number of organisations known as Hezbollah in the Gulf Arab states, such as Hezbollah Kuwait and Hezbollah Bahrain, all of which were part of the Gulf States' efforts to suppress pro-Iranian radicalism. These were the names given to pro-Iranian factions in the Gulf states, but their ties to Iran were rather weak or even non-existent. For example, the Bahraini government uses the term Bahraini Hezbollah to refer to Bahraini Shiites with close ties to Iran who are committed to terrorist acts, but they may not receive any direct support from Iran at all. There is a similar phenomenon in Kuwait, where the Shi'ites are described as a small, clandestine Hezbollah network with close ties to Iran, characterised by frequent travel to Iran and good relations with Iranian centres of religious and political authority. The UAE has also accused the Iranian-backed Hezbollah of being a sleeper group, but in fact the UAE has no history of Shia political organisation activity.
In summary, Iran's proxies in the Gulf Arab states have had little success, while the Gulf Arab states have used the 'Iranian threat' to suppress Shi'ite forces. In short, Iran has encountered considerable resistance in its quest to cultivate proxies in the Gulf states, as opposed to Lebanon, Yemen and Iraq. The biggest challenge to Iran's development of proxies is the strong state apparatus that most Gulf states have. The oil-rich Gulf states have invested heavily in security and intelligence, which makes it more difficult for Iran to penetrate the Arabian Peninsula or gain a real foothold.
The GCC and US influence is not conducive to Iran fostering proxies
The collective security mechanism of the GCC and the US political patronage and security guarantees for its Arab Gulf allies are also not conducive to Iranian proxies, while the exaggeration and shaping of the Iranian threat by the US, Saudi Arabia and other countries and the geopolitical competition behind it have amplified the perception of Iran's proxy strategy.
In the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia, as the leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), has been particularly emphatic in supporting the Gulf Arab states in their fight against Shiite protests on the grounds of countering the Iranian threat, such as supporting the Sunni royal family in Bahrain in 2011 on behalf of the GCC suppressing Shiite protests. In doing so, the Sunni royal family, the Saudi-led GCC and the US, which has a military base in Bahrain, have all worked hard to portray the Iranian threat and the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict, emphasising that Iran is behind the opposition in Bahrain. As a result, Bahrain's Sunni royal family, in conjunction with the Saudi-led GCC, has cracked down on the wave of Shiite protests in Bahrain, with the tacit approval and even connivance of the US. In fact, although both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have defined Iran as being behind the Shiite uprising in Bahrain, Iran's support for the Bahraini opposition has mainly been at the level of public opinion and diplomacy.
During the 2011 wave of protests in Bahrain, given that the Iranian-backed Bahraini Islamic Liberation Front had little influence in Bahrain by the late 1990s and that Iran had no proxies to exert influence, the reason why the Bahraini royal family, the Saudis and even the US continued to play up Iran's influence on Bahraini Shi'ites and perceive it from the perspective of sectarian and proxy infiltration was that the Iranian government had no influence on Bahraini Shi'ites. This is a reflection of Bahrain's domestic politics and the geopolitical game between Saudi Arabia, the US and Iran, which reflects the complexity of the Bahraini and Gulf issues. Therefore, Iran's proxy strategy needs to be viewed realistically and not blindly exaggerated.
The Shi'ite Crescent is not a monolith
A comparison of relations between Iran and Shi'a political organisations in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf Arab states leads to the following conclusions.
First, regarding the conditions for the establishment of patron-proxy relations between Iran and its proxies: the existence of marginalised Shi'a and anti-government Shi'a political organisations, political instability and the existence of strong external pressure are sufficient conditions for the successful establishment of patron-proxy relations, while the fragility of the regime in the countries where Shi'a political organisations are based is a necessary condition for the successful establishment of patron-proxy relations.
From a comparative perspective, there are many similarities in the conditions for patronage agency in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, such as the existence of marginalised Shi'a who are dissatisfied with the status quo, the presence of Shi'a political organisations engaged in anti-government activities, the fragility of state power and even the experience of prolonged civil and quasi-civil wars, and the strong pressure from external forces (e.g. Israel versus Hezbollah in Lebanon, Islamic State against the Iraqi Shiites, Saudi Arabia against the Houthis in Yemen), while the Gulf Arab states basically only have Shiites who are dissatisfied with the status quo and Shiite political organisations engaged in anti-government activities, while other conditions do not exist in the Gulf Arab states, especially the strong state under the authoritarian rule of the Gulf Arab monarchy The collective security mechanism of the GCC and the security patronage of the US are also huge obstacles for Iran to foster proxies, which is the root cause of the failure of Iran's proxy strategy in the Gulf Arab states.
Second, on the process and type of patron-proxy relations. The establishment of patron-proxy relations between Iran and Shia political organisations in the Middle East requires a complex process, generally going through stages such as environmental examination, agent selection, defining the relationship, maintaining and consolidating the relationship. In terms of the extent of the patron-agent relationship, its types can be classified as a closer relationship and a looser relationship.
Among the four cases that the author focuses on, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon is a completed sponsor-proxy relationship, and the relationship between the two sides has even gone beyond the sponsor-proxy relationship to a strategic alliance; Iran's relationship with Shi'ite political organisations in Iraq is in the process of defining the relationship and maintaining and consolidating the relationship, and a solid and mature sponsor-proxy relationship has not yet been established; Iran's relationship with the Houthi Iran and the Houthis in Yemen are still in the process of selecting their proxies, and despite some cooperation, they have not yet established a genuine patron-proxy relationship and their future is still uncertain; the Shiite political organisations in the Gulf states were largely dismantled by the repressive and softening measures of the Gulf states at the stage of Iran's selection of proxies.
With the exception of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which have a close patron-proxy relationship, all others have a loose patron-proxy relationship or no patron-proxy relationship. Understanding Iran's relationship with Middle Eastern Shi'ite political organisations in terms of differences in the processes and types of patron-proxy relationships helps to provide a relatively objective and accurate understanding of Iran's relationship with Middle Eastern Shi'ite forces. Iran's influence on Shiite forces in the Middle East varies in size, and the outside world, especially the so-called Shiite crescent from the Persian Gulf to Iraq to the Eastern Mediterranean (Lebanon and Syria), is not a monolithic whole, let alone a closely cooperating political entity.
Thirdly, there is the relationship between ideology and national interests. Iran's patron-proxy relationship with Shia religious and political organisations in the Middle East is deeply influenced by the ideology of its Islamic revolution, but also by its national interests, which are far more important than ideology.
As is well known, the goal of the Islamic revolution in Iran was to establish an Islamic republic internally and an Islamic order externally by exporting the revolution. Khomeini's Islamist ideology constitutes the ideological foundation and practical guide of Iran's internal and external policies, and is highlighted by the revolutionary principle of no East, no West, just Islam. As a result, Iran's export of revolution to the outside world is strongly ideological, and its patron-proxy relationship with Shia religious and political organisations in the Middle East is also strongly ideologically influenced.
In exporting revolutions and fostering proxies, Iran has always had a strong ideological mission and to the detriment of Iran's national interests, especially during the Khomeini period. But even during the Khomeini period, Iran was unable to ignore its national interests, which were even more important in the post-Khomeini period. Ideally, Iran aims to achieve the twin goals of ideology and national interest at the same time, but national interest is more important than ideology. The Iranian regime's pan-Islamist ideal is that the entire region is under the control of the Islamic Republic and that Iran is the regional leader and regional hegemon. These strategic goals are closely parallel to Iran's nationalist goals, its religious motivations. The Islamic Republic seeks to export its radical ideology to marginalised Shia populations and countries that might embrace its revolutionary discourse. In effect, the Iranian regime extends this reach by supporting Shiite governments affiliated with Iran and social movements throughout the region. However, it is worth noting that these interests are often secondary to the strategic goals of the state, and its key decisions are often driven by strategic objectives.
Among Iran's patron-proxy relationships with Shia political organisations in the Middle East, Iran's relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon has achieved the goal of balancing ideological and national interests, highlighted by the selection and support of Hezbollah, which adheres to an Islamist ideology, from among the many Shia political organisations in Lebanon, making Hezbollah in Lebanon a success story of Iran's exported revolution and an important partner in achieving Iran's national interests . In Iran's relations with Shi'ite political organisations in Iraq, Yemen and the Gulf Arab states, on the other hand, although Iran also values the importance of sectarian identity and Islamist ideology in the selection of proxies, it does not simply pursue a one-sided ideological convergence between Iran and its proxies based on the complexity of history and reality, but chooses to cooperate pragmatically on the basis of national interests. A comparison of Iran's patron-proxy relationship with Hezbollah and other Shia political organisations reveals that a common ideological base is clearly one of the reasons for Iran's closer, stronger and more successful relationship with Hezbollah.
Source: The Paper
(The views expressed in this article are those of the author or interviewees and do not represent the position of this research institution)
